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I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs often seek both common law relief, like damages, and equitable
relief, like an injunction or a constructive trust, in the same lawsuit. Under
Mississippi law, no single trial court has the power to resolve all kinds of
disputes. While the Mississippi Constitution vests jurisdiction in chancery
courts over equity and some other matters,I circuit courts retain general original
jurisdiction over other claims. Thus, chancery courts have jurisdiction over
actions for injunctions or divorce, but circuit courts have jurisdiction over tort
lawsuits for money damages.2
Liberal pleading rules permit parties to join multiple claims in a single
complaint,3 and failure to raise claims or counterclaims can lead to their
1. See infra Part II.
2. The legislature prudently avoided this dilemma in creating county courts. MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-9-
21(1) (2014) (giving county courts jurisdiction "concurrent with the circuit and chancery courts in all matters
of law and equity wherein the amount of value of the thing in controversy shall not exceed, exclusive of costs
and interest, the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000)."). But county courts do not exist in all
counties and do not have jurisdiction over divorce, probate, and other non-equity matters vested in chancery
court.
3. Miss. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) (permitting pleading of alternative and inconsistent claims); Miss. R. Civ. P.
13 (permitting any counterclaim against the plaintiff and requiring counterclaim that arises from the same
transaction or occurrence); Miss. R. Civ. P. 18(a) (permitting joinder of all claims against opposing party);
Miss. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (permitting liberal joinder of parties with respect to claims and defenses arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences where there is a common question of
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extinction under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.4 Moreover,
the choice of court has a decisive bearing on the right to a jury trial preserved by
the Mississippi Constitution.5 Circuit courts try actions for damages to a jury.
In contrast, there is no right to a jury in cases within the equity jurisdiction of
chancery court.
The Mississippi Constitution requires trial courts to respect their
jurisdictional limits, and the Mississippi Supreme Court has repeatedly
addressed the problem of which court should hear cases where parties seek both
a common law remedy and equitable relief.6 As the court itself has
acknowledged, it "has not drawn a bright line concerning equity and law
jurisdiction."7  And it has given mixed signals about which court should try
cases of mixed jurisdiction.
The resulting uncertainty about which trial court should decide mixed
jurisdiction cases is undesirable. Conflicting decisions leave parties uncertain
about where to file, encourage manipulative tactics, and provide trial judges with
no clear guidance. This leads to frequent interlocutory appeals that delay trial,
inflate litigation costs, and require appellate resources to be expended
unnecessarily.
fact or law).
4. E.g., Miss. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaims arising from the same transaction or
occurrence must be raised or they cannot be raised subsequently); Charlot v. Henry, 45 So. 3d 1237, 1243
(Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (holding defense of adverse possession was waived when not raised as counterclaim).
5. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 31. The Mississippi Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the fundamental
importance of the right to trial by jury. See Riverboat Corp. v. Harrison Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 198 So. 3d
289, 295 (Miss. 2016) ("The jury represents the community's conscience and common sense-qualities not
always exhibited by the government. Nothing gives our citizenry more direct participation in the running of
their own government than voting and jury service . . . . 'The right of trial by jury, as it exists here, is derived
from the common law, and it is so highly valuable to the citizen, so essential to liberty, that it is secured as a
constitutional right, and must, in a government like ours, be understood to extend at least as far as it did at
common law, and if alterations are made, policy would dictate an extension rather than a restriction of a
privilege invaluable in itself, and so highly prized by the citizen."') (quoting Smith's Adm'r v. Smith, 1
Howard 102, 105 (Miss. 1834)).
6. The de novo standard applies on appellate review of both challenges to subject matter jurisdiction
and alleged deprivations of the right to trial by jury. "The cases are legion where we have stated that the issue
of jurisdiction is a question of law which we must review applying a de novo standard." City of Starkville v. 4-
County Elec. Power Ass'n, 909 So. 2d 1094, 1101 (Miss. 2005) (citing Trustmark Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 865
So. 2d 1148, 1150 (Miss. 2004), Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Smith, 854 So. 2d 1045, 1048 (Miss. 2003), Rogers
v. Eaves, 812 So. 2d 208, 211 (Miss. 2002)). See also Copiah Medical Assoc. v. Mississippi Baptist Health
Sys., 898 So. 2d 656, 660 (Miss. 2005) (citing Briggs & Stratton Corp., 854 So. 2d at 1048)). The court also
conducts de novo review of denials of the right to trial by jury. See Riverboat Corp. v. Harrison Cty. Bd. of
Supervisors, 198 So. 3d 289, 290 (Miss. 2016) (observing that jury trial is a constitutional right and "[t]he
standard of review this Court employs for constitutional issues is de novo").
7. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 854 So. 2d at 1048. Over a decade ago, Justice Carlson decried the
increasing frequency with which the Mississippi Supreme Court was forced to address the problem on
interlocutory appeal. Trustmark Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 865 So. 2d 1148, 1153 (Miss. 2004) ("We take this
opportunity to inform the trial bench and bar of an ever-increasing problem we are encountering-this Court is
inundated with interlocutory appeals, many of which involve the issue of whether a case has been appropriately
commenced in circuit or chancery court."). Id. at 1152. As an aid to the court, he urged trial judges "to
studiously and timely" consider motions for transfer. Id. Further, he implored trial judges to articulate the
grounds for denying motions for transfer on the record to facilitate appellate review. Id. at 1153. Justice
Carlson observed that the majority of motions for transfer were from chancery to circuit court. Id. (citing
Briggs & Stratton Corp., 854 So. 2d 1045 (Miss. 2003), City of Ridgeland v. Fowler, 846 So. 2d 210 (Miss.
2003), United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Estate of Francis, 825 So. 2d 38 (Miss. 2002)).
MIXED CASES OF LAW AND EQUITY
This Article reviews the legal sources that have led to the current state of
the law and proposes a practical solution to the forum dilemma presented by
mixed jurisdiction cases. Specifically, Part II surveys the historical background
of the jurisdictional division between common law and non-common law courts
in England and in early Mississippi history. Part III discusses the treatment of
the problem under the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. Part IV examines
Mississippi Supreme Court decisions that address mixed jurisdiction cases. Part
V proposes a framework for resolving the question of mixed jurisdiction.
Consistent with the majority of the court's decisions, this Article proposes that,
absent exceptional circumstances, cases of mixed common law and equity claims
should be brought in circuit court or transferred to circuit court from chancery
court. The Article further proposes that such transfers should occur within a
reasonable time after the commencement of the action.
II. HISTORY OF JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS
A. Law, Equity, and Mixed Jurisdiction in England
In medieval England, two distinct legal systems evolved: common law and
equity. The common law was administered by the central royal courts, which
fashioned "an aristocratic law, for and of the gentry and nobility" 8 separate from
the local laws administered in county or manorial court systems. Over time the
relief provided by common law courts ossified into the forms of action embodied
in common law writs. When a person could not obtain a remedy in the common
law courts, however, he or she could still petition the crown directly. The king's
chancellor heard such petitions, and in adjudicating disputes the chancellor
purported to "do equity" to distinguish his work from that of the royal common
law courts.9 "Through a long and complex process, chancery itself became a
court."10 Chancery in theory exercised its power only to supplement he work of
the common law courts. To establish the chancellor's jurisdiction and show
entitlement to an equitable remedy, a party was required to show the absence of
an adequate remedy at common law.11
In dispensing equity, the chancellor purported to apply principles that were
less rigid than the rules of decision applied by common law courts. The
chancellor even claimed "the power to dispense with unjust rules."1 2 Over time,
parties in the common law courts increasingly relied on trespass forms of action
8. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW xvii (3d ed. 2005).
9. The chancellor was a powerful royal official who kept the king's seal. Id. Early chancellors were
often ecclesiastics and were "said to be 'keeper of the king's conscience."' Id. at xviii. The idea of "equity" as
distinct from law thus served a jurisdictional purpose (to explain the adjudication of cases that were not
appropriate to law courts) and had a moral component (to justify the divergence of rules administered by the
chancellor from legal norms).
10. Id.; see also J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 97-115 (4th ed. 2002)
(discussing the development of chancery courts and equity as a body of law separate from the common law).
11. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at xviii (stating that the chancellor "would dismiss a case if the
plaintiff had an 'adequate remedy at law').
12. Id. at xviii; see also BAKER, supra note 10, at 103 (stating that the chancellor's "court was a court of
conscience, in which defendants could be coerced into doing whatever conscience required in the full
circumstances of the case").
2017] 389
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
that resulted in judgments for money damages as the remedy. Common law
courts had limited power to compel performance or other forms of specific
relief.13 In contrast, the chancellor sitting in equity developed a variety of
remedies to coerce parties to perform obligations, including the subpoena,
injunction, and constructive trust.14 And the chancellor enforced obligations-
notably uses and trusts-that were not recognized by common law courts.
Additionally, the two judicial systems developed different procedural rules.15
Parties enjoyed the right to jury trial in common law actions seeking money
damages, but the chancellor sat without a jury in equity.16
For a variety of reasons, including the fact that a single chancellor was
responsible for overseeing all equity cases, the very word "chancery" became
"synonymous with expense, delay and espair" by the 1800s in England.17
Charles Dickens dramatically portrayed the ruinous state of affairs in Bleak
House (1852-53). By the end of the nineteenth century, the movement for law
reform in England achieved the institutional merger of law and equity in a single
court system.18
B. Law and Equity in Early American Jurisprudence
Each North American colony developed its own legal system,19 but colonial
courts shared common structural characteristics. Each had "a pyramid of
courts," with a high court at the top, intermediate courts, "and at the base a single
judge, justice of the peace, or the equivalent."20
As the colonial court structure became more complex in the eighteenth
century, the "[f]unctional specialization of courts" occurred more frequently.2 1
One of the specialized systems that emerged was a chancery system,22 but
chancery courts did not develop the same way in each colony. Some colonies
did not create separate equity courts.23  Instead, "other courts handled,
piecemeal, those equitable matters felt essential."24  Other colonies created
13. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at xviii.
14. Id.
15. Id.; see also BAKER, supra note 10, at 103-04 (describing early chancery procedures).
16. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at xviii.
17. BAKER, supra note 10, at 111-13 (discussing the defects that developed in the English chancery
system); see id. (noting that "[i]t is the height of irony that the court which originated to provide an escape from
the defects of common-law procedure should in its later history have developed procedural defects worse by far
than those of the law").
18. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at xix; see also BAKER, supra note 10, at 113-15 (discussing the merger of
law and equity in England). In the United States, in contrast, "the distinction between law and equity lingered
on for a surprisingly long time." FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at xix.
19. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 30-31 (quoting GEORGE L. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY
MASSACHUSETTS 6 (1960)). The growth of these individual systems was influenced by "'[g]eographical
isolation, the date and character of the . . . settlements, [and] the degree of absence of outside supervision or
control."' Id. at 31. Thus, "[a]t any particular time ... the law of a certain colony was made up of a set of
related traditions, some English, and some local-modified in light of current conditions." Id.
20. Id. at 44.
21. See id. at 45.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 47.
24. Id.
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equity courts-or an equivalent system where judges would alternate sitting "at
law" and "in equity."2 5 Although "[i]n some of the leading colonies, equity, as a
remedial system . . . had no existence at all," 2 6 the "southern colonies quite
generally had courts of chancery."27
Because American colonists were hostile to chancery courts, equity
jurisdiction did not develop as quickly as the jurisdiction of the common law
courts.2 8 Many reasons have been offered to explain the hostility towards
chancery during the colonial period. First, "[c]hancery was closely associated
with executive power, [and] in turn with the English overlords."29 Second,
because there was no jury in chancery court, "public opinion could not
effectively control the use of the court as a tool of imperial policy." 30 Third,
because equity courts generally sat only in the capital, equity, unlike the
common law . .. was not brought to every man's doorstep."3 1 Fourth, "chancery
procedures were clumsy, inefficient, interminable."3 2 One scholar surmised that
the fundamental reason for colonial hostility to equity jurisdiction was "the fact
that the colonists regarded equity as an appendage of the Crown's prerogative,
and, therefore, inimical to their individual liberties. Chancellors were
accordingly regarded as "'royalist persons administering the law of an effete
monarchy.'"33
Despite the colonists' hostility to equity jurisdiction, the American
Revolution did not lead to the abolition of separate chancery courts.34 But over
time most states followed the federal courts in merging law and equity. Today,
Mississippi is one of only three states that maintain a separate system of
common law and equity courts.3 5
25. Id.
26. Robert von Moschzisker, Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 287, 287
(1927).
27. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 20.
28. von Moschzisker, supra note 26, at 288.
29. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 21; see also von Moschzisker, supra note 26, at 288 (stating that
colonial hostility to equity jurisdiction "may . . . have been a later reflection of the spirit of antagonism to the
Chancellor's power, which existed in England" where "the administration of equity was not . . . based on
settled principles, but depended upon the exceedingly flexible conscience of the Chancellor").
30. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 21.
31. Id. at 48.
32. Id. See also von Moschzisker, supra note 26, at 288-89 (noting that the fact that the "supplicatory
form of a bill in equity was opposed to" the Puritan religion and "popular distrust of the legal profession" may
also have negatively affected "the progress of equity").
33. von Moschzisker, supra note 26, at 289 (quoting J.H. Beale, Equity in America, I CAMBRIDGE L.J.
21, 23 (1921)).
34. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 21.
35. Delaware and Tennessee also have separate equity courts. Other states, like New Jersey, have a
separate chancery division, while South Carolina uses "masters-in-equity" to preside over litigation of
equitable matters.
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C. Law, Equity, and Mixed Jurisdiction in Mississippi Before 1890
1. Courts in the Mississippi Territory (1790-1817)
The Mississippi Territory was established by federal legislation in 1798,
and over time the territorial court system evolved into a system of inferior
county courts, superior territorial courts, and a supreme court.3 6 The superior
territorial courts, or Superior Courts of Law and Equity, were comprised of
territorial judges who were appointed by the President under federal law.37
Among other things, the superior courts sat as trial courts and had "exclusive
jurisdiction over matters where the amount in controversy exceeded fifty
dollars."3 8 Although the federal law that created the Mississippi Territory
"specifically imposed only the common law on the territory and granted the
territorial judges 'common law jurisdiction,"' the territorial legislature
"bestowed equity jurisdiction on the superior territorial courts in 1802."39 Thus,
Mississippi courts early inherited the dual jurisdiction of law and equity.40
2. Courts Under the Constitution of 1817
Under the first Mississippi Constitution in 1817,41 the Mississippi
legislature created separate superior (or circuit) courts and chancery courts,
among others.4 2 The legislature gave the circuit courts original jurisdiction over
all "suits and actions" at law,43 but, as mandated by the constitution, imposed an
amount in controversy of fifty dollars or more in civil cases.44 Additionally, the
legislature authorized the circuit courts to hear "every case not given to some
other court."4 5 The legislature granted the chancery courts exclusive jurisdiction
over equitable matters,46 as long as the amount in controversy was at least fifty
dollars.4 7
At the same time, the legislature gave circuit courts power to grant
equitable relief in the form of injunctions and writs of ne exeat.4 8 This provision
appeared to contradict both the constitutional and statutory directives regarding
36. Michael M. Hoffheimer, Mississippi Courts: 1790-1868, 65 MISS. L.J. 99, 105-16 (1995).
37. Id.. at 108, 114-15.
38. Id. at 116.
39. Id. at 112.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 116.
42. MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. V, §§1 & 6. See generally Hoffheimer, supra note 36, at 119, 121-36.
43. Act to Reduce into One the Several Acts and parts of Acts Concerning the Establishment,
Jurisdiction and Powers of the Superior Courts of Law § 16, June 1822 Miss. Laws 30, Rev. Code of the Laws
of Mississippi 105-06 (George Poindexter comp. 1824) [hereinafter Rev. Code Miss. 1824]. See generally
Hoffheimer, supra note 36, at 121-22.
44. MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. V, § 4; Rev. Code Miss. 1824, supra note 43. See generally Hoffheimer,
supra note 36, at 119, 122.
45. Rev. Code Miss. 1824, supra note 43, at 105-06.
46. Act to Establish a Court of Chancery, § 2, 1822 [Nov. 1821] Miss. Laws 105, Rev. Code Miss.
1824, supra note 43, at 84.
47. Act to Establish a Court of Chancery, § 21, 1822 [Nov. 1821] Miss. Laws 111, Rev. Code Miss.
1824, supra note 43, at 90. "The legislature never created inferior courts of equity, nor did it bestow equity
jurisdiction on the county courts or justices of the peace." Hoffheimer, supra note 36, at 136.
48. Rev. Code Miss. 1824, supra note 43, at 144.
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the chancery courts' exclusive equity jurisdiction, as well as the legislative
mandate that circuit courts had jurisdiction to hear only those cases that were not
given by statute to another court.49 Furthermore, although equity jurisdiction
required the absence of an adequate legal remedy, chancellors could still acquire
jurisdiction over legal claims in various ways.50
3. Courts Under the Constitution of 1832
During the era of Jacksonian democracy, white Mississippians demanded
more power in government, which resulted in a constitutional convention and a
new constitution in 1832.51 Like the 1817 Mississippi Constitution, the new
Mississippi Constitution and the laws enacted under it gave circuit courts general
original jurisdiction over "all . . . civil . . . cases not given exclusively to some
other court" where the amount in controversy exceeded fifty dollars.52 The
circuit courts "continued to have broad remedial power to issue extraordinary
writs." 53  In a significant change from the first Mississippi Constitution,
however, the 1832 constitution authorized the legislature to give circuit courts
jurisdiction over matters in equity where the amount in controversy did not
exceed five hundred dollars,54 and the legislature quickly did S0.55
Furthermore, the 1832 Mississippi Constitution "conferred full equity
jurisdiction on a single chancellor" who sat as the superior court of chancery,56
and the legislature eventually created inferior chancery courts that had
concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court of chancery over claims up to five
hundred thousand dollars.57 Over time, however, the legislature became hostile
to the chancery courts.5 8 The legislature enlarged the power of circuit courts to
grant equitable relief,59 and in 1857 all chancery courts were eliminated by a
constitutional amendment that vested full equity jurisdiction in the circuit
courts.60 Although the reasons for the legislature's hostility to the chancery
courts are uncertain, the legislature was likely motivated by economic and
efficiency concerns6 1 as well as by the difficulty and expense of obtaining
49. See Hoffheimer, supra note 36, at 122-23.
50. Id. at 125-26.
51. David G. Sansing, Mississippi's Four Constitutions, 56 MISS. L.J. 3,7 (1986).
52. Hoffheimer, supra note 36, at 144 (citing MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. IV, § 14).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 146 (citing MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. IV, § 16).
55. Id. (citing Act to Organize and Establish Circuit Courts § 6, Jan. 1833 Miss. Laws 28-29, in LAWS
OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; EMBRACING ALL ACTS OF A PUBLIC NATURE FROM JANUARY SESSION, 1824, TO
JANUARY SESSION 1838, INCLUSIVE 404 (1838)).
56. MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. IV, § 16.
57. Act to Establish an Inferior Court of Chancery in the Northern part of this State § 1, 3, 1842 Miss.
Laws 57-65).
58. Hoffheimer, supra note 36,at 153.
59. Id. at 146-48.
60. MISS. CONST. of 1832, amended by Rev. Code Miss. 38 (1857); Act in Relation to Chancery Courts,
art. 2, § II, 1856 Miss. Laws 3-38.
61. See Frank E. Everett, Jr., Lawyers, Courts, and Judges 1890-1970, in 2 A HISTORY OF MISSISSIPPI
375, 377 (Richard A. McLemore ed. 1973)).
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equitable relief from a single chancellor who might be sitting in a distant part of
the state.62
4. Courts Under the Constitution of 1869
After the Civil War, 63 a new constitution was ratified in 1869 that
established the form of the court system that has endured down to the present.64
It created circuit courts of general jurisdiction, eliminated their equity
jurisdiction,65 and reestablished separate chancery courts, giving the chancery
courts both equity and probate jurisdiction.66
D. Law, Equity, and Mixed Jurisdiction Under the Constitution of 1890
Mississippi's current constitution was adopted in 1890. The key provisions
governing the jurisdiction of the courts have remained unchanged, though later
amendments required election of all judges,67 and new courts have been created
by the legislature.68 The 1890 constitution retained the system of separate
circuit and chancery courts established under the 1869 constitution, but it also
recognized and attempted to address some of the problems that had arisen due to
conflicts between legal and equitable jurisdiction.69
1. The Jurisdiction of the Circuit and Chancery Courts
The 1890 Mississippi Constitution established circuit courtS70 and
authorized them to hear all civil matters that the constitution did not vest "in
some other court."7 1 These matters included "[c]ases legally analogous to those
traditionally considered actions at law[] and . .. heard within the common law
courts of England" and the United States.7 2 Today, circuit courts can hear
claims over $200 not vested in another court.7 3
62. Id. (stating that "the persistence of the legislature's efforts to control the chancery court suggests
that the legislature was equally concerned with the problem of the accessibility of equitable remedies").
63. During the war, courts ceased to function. Hoffheimer, supra note 36, at 165.
64. Id. at 169.
65. MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 14.
66. MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 16.
67. MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. VI, § 145 (providing for appointment of three supreme court justices by
governor with consent of senate), amended to provide for the election of justices by judicial district. Id.
(amended 1916). Comparable amendments related to other judicial officers resulted in the restoration of the
elected judiciary that existed under previous constitutions.
68. MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-4-1 & 3 (2014) (creating court of appeals); see MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-9-1 &
21 (2014) (creating and prescribing jurisdiction of county courts).
69. See Hoffheimer, supra note 36, at 169-70 & n. 394.
70. MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. VI, § 152.
71. Id. § 156 ("The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil ... in this State not
vested by this constitution in some other court [.]").
72. James L. Robertson, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, in MISSISSIPPI CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1:11, at 38
(2016 ed.) [hereinafter MISS. CIV. PRO.].
73. MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-7-81 (2014) ("The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all actions
when the principal of the amount in controversy exceeds two hundred dollars, and of all other actions and
causes, matters and things arising under the constitution and laws of this state which are not exclusively
cognizable in some other court. . . .").
The legislature has also authorized the circuit courts to exercise original jurisdiction over a variety of matters.
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The 1890 constitution also established chancery courtS74 and gave them
"full jurisdiction" over specific types of cases, including "[a]ll matters in
equity," and cases involving divorce and alimony, decedents' estates, juvenile
law, and persons of unsound mind.75 By allocating jurisdiction over such matters
to the chancery courts, those cases were vested "in some other court" and
therefore excluded from the circuit courts' jurisdiction.76 As it had done with
the circuit courts, the legislature also gave chancery courts original jurisdiction
over some additional types of caseS77 and authorized the circuit and chancery
courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over some actions.7 8
2. The Problem of Mixed Jurisdiction
Although Mississippi had separate circuit and chancery courts long before
the 1890 constitution was adopted, "[t]he line of demarcation between the two
systems and their courts was never clear or precise or discernable without
difficulty." 7 9 Not surprisingly, the "result was expense and delay and time
consuming litigation over jurisdictional questions."8 0  While the 1890
Mississippi Constitution perpetuated separate circuit and chancery courts, it also
included provisions that were designed to ameliorate some of the inevitable
jurisdictional problems caused by a divided court system.8' First, recognizing
that it was difficult to determine whether certain cases belonged in circuit or
chancery court, the 1890 constitution explicitly gave the chancery courts
"jurisdiction to grant complete relief in land title actions even if a legal remedy
existed"82 and it gave them concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts over
certain actions involving fiduciaries and accounting.83
Miss. CIV. PRO., supra note 72, § 1:16, at 55-56 (discussing and citing various statutes). As courts of general
jurisdiction, the circuit courts have jurisdiction over any new action that arises unless jurisdiction is specifically
given to a different court. Id. § 1:8, at 31.
74. MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. VI, § 152.
75. Id. § 159 ("The chancery court shall have full jurisdiction in the following matters and cases, viz.:
(a) All matters in equity; (b) Divorce and alimony; (c) Matters testamentary and of administration; (d)
Minor's business; (e) Cases of idiocy, lunacy, and persons of unsound mind; (f) All cases of which the said
court had jurisdiction under the laws in force when this Constitution is put in operation.").
76. MISS. CIV. PRO., supra note 72, § 1:4, at 21.
77. See id. § 1:17, at 62 (citing various statutes).
78. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-37-101 (2014) (giving a supreme court justice, circuit court judge,
chancellor, county judge, and justice court judge power to issue writ of replevin); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-9-15
(2013) (giving circuit, chancery, and county courts concurrent jurisdiction over actions to establish paternity
and award child support).
79. James L. Robertson, Constitutional Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MISSISSIPPI LAW § 19:196, at 312
(2016 ed.) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA].
80. Id.
81. Hoffheimer, supra note 36, at 170 n. 394; ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 79, § 19:196, at 312-14.
82. MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. VI, § 160 ("And in addition to the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by
the chancery court in suits to try title and to cancel deeds and other clouds upon title to real estate, it shall have
jurisdiction in such cases to decree possession, and to displace possession; to decree rents and compensation for
improvements and taxes; and in all cases where said court heretofore exercised jurisdiction, auxiliary to courts
of common law, it may exercise such jurisdiction to grant the relief sought although the legal remedy may not
have been exhausted or the legal title established by a suit at law.").
83. Id. § 161 ("And the chancery court shall have jurisdiction, concurrent with the circuit court, of suits
on bonds of fiduciaries and public officers for failure to account for money or property received, or wasted or
lost by neglect or failure to collect, and of suits involving inquiry into matters of mutual accounts; but if the
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Second, the 1890 constitution acknowledged that some cases would be filed
in the wrong court, and it mandated that such cases "shall be transferred" to the
proper court.84  Moreover, the constitution addressed a problem that had
continually plagued Mississippi's judicial system since the state's adoption of a
dual system of common law and equity: some cases had proceeded to final
judgment in a court that lacked jurisdiction based on an erroneous
characterization of the case as being either law or equity and then were reversed
on appeal due to the jurisdictional error.85 To resolve this problem, section 147
of the constitution provided:
No judgment or decree in any chancery or circuit court rendered
in a civil cause shall be reversed or annulled on the ground of
want of jurisdiction to render said judgment or decree, from any
error or mistake as to whether the cause in which it was rendered
was of equity or common law jurisdiction.86
If an additional non-jurisdictional error established grounds for reversing,
then section 147 gave the Mississippi Supreme Court the power to remand the
case to whichever court it decided can "best determine the controversy."87
The drafters of the constitution did not want the possible difficulty of
determining subject matter jurisdiction to impede the work of the trial courts.
They anticipated that "once the circuit court transfers a case to the chancery
court or vice versa, 'the court to which it is transferred should and must proceed
with the case. '88 Although the constitution prevented reversal solely when the
trial court erred in characterizing an action as common law or equity, the
legislature provided that transfer established valid jurisdiction regardless of the
basis for the transfer, even if the court lacked jurisdiction prior to the erroneous
transfer.89
One issue the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 did not address was the
conflict created by the interaction of section 147 and the right to a jury trial
preserved by section 31.90 Although the current version of section 31 recognizes
plaintiff brings his suit in the circuit court, that court may, on application of the defendant, transfer the cause to
the chancery court, if it appear that the accounts to be investigated are mutual and complicated."). See
generally Hoffheimer, supra note 36, at 170 n. 394; ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 79, § 19:196, at 313.
84. Id. § 157 ("All causes that may be brought in the circuit court whereof the chancery court has
exclusive jurisdiction shall be transferred to the chancery court."); id. § 162 ("All causes that may be brought in
the chancery court whereof the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction shall be transferred to the circuit court.").
85. JOHN RAY SKATES, JR., A HISTORY OF THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT, 1817-1948, 43-44 (1973).
86. MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. VI, § 147.
87. Id. ("[I]f the supreme court shall find error in the proceedings other than as to jurisdiction, and it
shall be necessary to remand the case, the supreme court may remand it to that court which in its opinion can
best determine the controversy.").
88. MISS. CIV. PRO., supra note 72, § 1:10, at 35 (quoting Hopson v. Meredith, 719 So. 2d 1176 (Miss.
1998); Ainsworth v. Blakeney, 86 So. 2d 501 (1956) (citation omitted)).
89. See infra notes 97 & 322 (discussing MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-5-81 (1991)).
90. MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. III, § 31 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."). This
section was subsequently amended to provide that "the legislature may, by enactment, provide that in all civil
suits tried in the circuit and chancery court, nine or more jurors may agree on the verdict and return it as the
verdict of the jury." Id. § 31(b).
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the possibility of jury trials in chancery court, it is settled that the constitutional
right to a jury trial "extends only to those civil actions where a jury trial was
available according to the principles of the common law." 9 1 Because chancery
courts have jurisdiction over equity and other matters outside the common law,
the constitutional right to a jury trial "does not extend to cases heard in the
chancery courts."92
This means that under section 147, when a chancery court errs in exercising
jurisdiction over a common law matter and denies a litigant the right to a jury
trial, its judgment may not be reversed on appeal if the sole error is a
jurisdictional error as between law and equity.93 Consequently, section 147
limits the right to a jury trial provided for in the Mississippi Bill of Rights.94 One
commentator notes, "[T]he problem of accommodating the right of trial by jury
with the occasional ability of a nimble plaintiff to bring what is essentially an
action at law under some equitable rubric[] refuses to go away."95
III. MISSISSIPPI CASE LAW
Under the system created by the Mississippi Constitution of 1890,
interlocutory appeals were not freely available. The Mississippi Supreme Court
was the only appellate court, and its review occurred only when final judgments
ended litigation.9 6 Because the constitution eliminated the supreme court's
power to reverse when the sole error was lack of jurisdiction due to
misclassification of a case as common law or equity, it effectively gave circuit
and chancery courts concurrent jurisdiction over such cases when they erred in
refusing to transfer them. This grant of overlapping jurisdiction was not an
oversight; it was the purpose of section 147.
Appellate decisions addressing the proper court for mixed cases emerged
only after the Mississippi Supreme Court began to grant interlocutory review of
trial court transfer rulings. The cases display a variety of approaches to the
91. MISS. CIV. PRO., supra note 72, § 1:19, at 66 & n.2 (citing various cases); see also Luther T.
Munford & E. Marcus Wiggs, III, Commentary On the Bill of Rights in the Mississippi Constitution of 1890
and Beyond, 56 MISS. L.J. 73, 112 (1986).
92. MISS. CIV. PRO., supra note 72, § 1:19, at 67. Although section 31 is inapplicable in chancery court,
a chancellor may use his or her discretion to "direct a trial by jury of traditional common law issues." Id. See
generally McLean v. Green, 352 So. 2d 1312, 1314 (Miss. 1977) ("In chancery court, with some few statutory
exceptions, the right to a jury is purely within the discretion of the chancellor, and if one is empaneled, its
findings are totally advisory.").
93. See MISS. CIV. PRO., supra note 72, at 34-35.
94. See Munford & Wiggs, supra note 91, at 112-13.
95. MISS. CIV. PRO., supra note 72, § 1:19, at 74-75.
96. Under appellate procedure in 1890, appeals of right lay only from final judgments of circuit courts,
MISS. CODE 1892 § 32, and certain chancery court decrees (including denials of demurrers), id. § 33.
Chancellors in their discretion could authorize appeals for interlocutory decisions. Id. § 34. See MISS. CODE
1848 ch. 54 § 37 (permitting chancellor to grant appeal from interlocutory order). Circuit courts had no such
power. Justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court could grant appeals of interlocutory decisions in chancery,
but only under limited circumstances that did not include jurisdictional error. MISS. CODE 1892 § 4344.
Through subsequent legislation, the Mississippi Supreme Court acquired broader authority to grant review of
interlocutory decrees in chancery when the chancellor refused to grant an appeal. MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-3-33
(repealed 1991) & § 11-51-7 (repealed 1993). The legislature has since authorized the supreme court to
prescribe rules for interlocutory appeals to the court, MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-3-61 (2014), and the criteria and
procedures for interlocutory review are now set forth in Miss. R. App. P. 5.
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problem of whether mixed jurisdiction cases can be brought in a single court
and, if so, which one. This part will first consider the cases that address the
power of circuit courts to hear cases that raise mixed questions of law and
equity. It will then consider the decisions that recognize chancery court
jurisdiction over such cases.
A. The Power of Circuit Courts to Hear Cases that Raise Mixed Questions of
Law and Equity
1. Circuit Court Jurisdiction Over Mixed Cases Filed in Circuit Court
Mississippi circuit courts are not, strictly speaking, common law courts.
Rather they are courts of general jurisdiction with judicial power to decide all
matters (including common law claims) that are not taken away from them under
the Mississippi Constitution. Even if deprived of jurisdiction under the
constitution, the legislature may restore it.97
The drafters of the 1890 Mississippi Constitution obviously assumed that
some cases were exclusively within the jurisdiction of either chancery or circuit
court, because they provided mechanisms for the transfer of such cases.98 Over
the years the Mississippi Supreme Court has clarified what kinds of cases fall
within the exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the chancery court. For example,
simple cases of equity lie within chancery court's exclusive jurisdiction, while
tort actions by injured minors or against estates do not fall under the class of
cases involving minors or decedent's estates that are vested in chancery court.99
Nevertheless, given liberal pleading requirements and the fact that equitable
relief is discretionary, many cases seeking an equitable remedy also request legal
relief as an alternative or supplement. The Mississippi Supreme Court has
repeatedly explained that circuit courts may exercise jurisdiction over equity
claims in cases where there is some appropriate basis for circuit court
jurisdiction. "' [I]f one issue is properly before the circuit court i has jurisdiction
to decide all issues."'1
00
97. Circuit courts are given authority to issue injunctions and all other remedial writs by statute, though
they are returnable in the proper court, MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-1-19 (2014), and to enter declaratory judgments
by rule, Miss. R. Civ. P. 51. They are given jurisdiction over cases over $200, MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-7-81
(2014), even though the Mississippi Constitution vests jurisdiction in justice court over such matters, MISS.
CONST. art. VI, § 171 (fixing maximum jurisdiction of justice court at $500 or greater amount as determined by
legislature).
Legislation also specifically vests jurisdiction in circuit and chancery courts over matters that are transferred to
them, see MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-5-81 (1991), infra note 322, and the supreme court has held this vests courts
with valid subject matter jurisdiction even when the transfer was erroneous, Burch v. Land Partners, L.P., 784
So. 2d 925, 928 (Miss. 2001) (quoting Hopson v. Meredith, 719 So. 2d 1176, 1177 (Miss. 1998)). The case law
establishes that the transferring court loses jurisdiction when it issues the order of transfer. Id.
98. MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. VI, § 147, quoted supra text accompanying note 86.
99. See infra notes 106 & 109. Similarly, declaratory judgments are "jurisdictionally neutral" and thus
not exclusively within chancery court jurisdiction. See RAS Family Partners, LP v. Onnam Biloxi, LLC, 968
So. 2d 926, 928-29 (Miss. 2007).
100. RAS Family Partners, LP, 968 So. 2d at 928 (quoting IP Timberlands Operating Co. v. Denmiss
Corp., 726 So. 2d 96, 111 (Miss. 1998)). See Derr Plantation v. Swarek, 14 So. 3d 711, 716 (Miss. 2006)
(recognizing that a complaint asserting variety of legal and equitable claims or demanding both legal and
equitable remedies could be brought in either circuit or chancery court).
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2. Transfer of Cases to Circuit Court Where Chancery Court Lacks Jurisdiction
or Jurisdiction is Doubtful
The Mississippi Supreme Court has made it clear that chancery courts must
transfer actions to circuit court when there is no basis for jurisdiction in chancery
court. In Dixie National Life Insurance Co. v. Allison, an insurance company
denied coverage, and the insured brought a claim in chancery court to enforce
the policy.101 The plaintiff styled her claim as a request for specific
performance.10 2 The chancery court entered a decree holding the insurer liable
for hospital expenses for a specific period of time but did not determine the
amount due for that period.103 The court reversed, finding that the decree was
not sufficiently certain to be enforceable.104 Moreover, the court proceeded to
address the question of jurisdiction, though there is no indication that any party
raised the issue:
We note further that this action was predicated on the theory of
specific performance. Actually, it was nothing more than a suit
for breach of contract and should have been brought in the
Circuit Court . . .. Therefore, we remand the case to the Circuit
Court.10 5
In Robertson v. Evans, a minor's guardian brought a personal injury tort
claim in chancery court seeking money damages.106 When the chancellor
refused to dismiss or transfer to circuit court, the defendant petitioned for
interlocutory appeal.10 7 In a short opinion the court cited the right to trial by
jury and then quoted language from McLean v. Green, a similar case in which
the defendants had not challenged the court's jurisdiction until after a final
judgment.'0 8 The McLean court had found itself constrained to affirm under
section 147 but opined that the tort action on behalf of minors was not properly
In unusual cases, it is even theoretically possible that circuit courts may have exclusive jurisdiction over a
matter in equity when that matter relates to the small group of legal claims that cannot be heard in chancery
court. See infra note 243 (discussing Justice James "Jimmy" Robertson's opinion in Thompson v. First
National Bank and Mutual Savings Life Ins. Co., 427 So. 2d 973, 976 (Miss. 1983)).
101. 372 So. 2d 1081, 1081 (Miss. 1979).
102. Id
103. Id
104. The short opinion raises more questions than it answers. It explains the decree's legal failure by a
rhetorical question: "If an execution were levied on this decree, what amount would it be for?" Id. at 1085. One
answer would be that the decree would be enforced not by execution but by proceedings in contempt to the
extent that the defendant refused to pay an amount that was either liquidated or not in dispute.
105. Id at 1081. The court presumably meant the case was really an action for damages for breach of
contract.
106. 400 So. 2d 1214, 1214 (Miss. 1981).
107. Id
108. Id at 1215 (quoting McLean v. Green, 352 So. 2d 1312 (Miss. 1977)). It is not clear that section
147 actually barred appellate review in McLean inasmuch as the error may not have been between law and
equity but rather between law and "minor's matters." Id Since tort actions by minors are clearly not within the
chancellor's jurisdiction, the Mississippi Supreme Court seems to have assumed that the chancellor was
exercising jurisdiction over the legal claims under the grant of equity jurisdiction. McLean, 352 So. 2d at 1314.
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brought in chancery court and should have been transferred to circuit court.109
The Robertson case marks the beginning of the court's active interlocutory
review of transfer decisions because the defendant in Robertson avoided the fatal
error committed by the appellant in McLean and sought review before final
judgment.110 The court's response indicated some initial uncertainty about how
to treat such appeals. While denying the petition, the court remanded the case
with directions to transfer the action to the circuit court.1 11  Its short opinion
reached the right result, but its brevity left room for confusion.112
Justice Robertson returned to the issue, producing a scholarly opinion for a
divided court in Tillotson v. Anders.113 The case involved a former chancery
court officer, a chancery clerk, who responded to critical newspaper coverage by
suing the newspaper in chancery court.114 While essentially a libel action, the
plaintiffs complaint invoked equity jurisdiction in three ways: it demanded an
accounting; it contended that equity was required to prevent a multiplicity of
suits; and it demanded a declaratory judgment.115 On interlocutory review of the
chancery court's denial of a motion to dismiss, the court had no difficulty seeing
that the lawsuit was a libel action seeking damages, "disguise[d] . . . as one for
an accounting."11 6  It reversed, offering two different reasons. First, the court
concluded that chancery court lacked jurisdiction: "We hold that this case lies
outside the limited subject matter jurisdiction of the chancery court." 1 7 Second,
the court justified its conclusion, not by the complete absence of constitutional
109. Robertson, 400 So. 2d at 1215.
110. The court's interlocutory jurisdiction, authorized by statute, is now provided by court rule. MISS.
CODE ANN. § 11-51-7 (repealed); see supra note 96 (discussing Miss. R. App. P. 5 and MIss. CODE ANN. § 9-
3-61 (2014)).
The power to review jurisdictional error by interlocutory decision was not beyond doubt. See Tillotson v.
Anders, 551 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1989) (Robertson, J.) (providing extended constitutional and historical
explanation for Mississippi Supreme Court authority to correct erroneous jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal);
id. at 219-20 (Hawkins, J., and three other justices dissenting).
111. It concluded, in language borrowed from McLean, that the chancery judge should transfer this cause
of action to the proper circuit court and thus avoid a clear abuse of discretion. Robertson, 400 So. 2d at 1214.
112. First, the court did not explain how it could simultaneously refuse to grant the petition for
interlocutory appeal (presumably thereby indicating that it lacked appellate jurisdiction), yet remand with
directions to transfer that would be binding on the lower court. Second, it did not explain how a refusal to
dismiss or transfer an action by a court lacking any constitutional authority to decide the case could be
characterized as an abuse of discretion, rather than an error of law.
The characterization of the error could affect the standard of appellate review and possibly the forms of
extraordinary relief that might be available. Mandamus or prohibition, for example, would not normally be
available to cure an abuse of discretion but would lie to correct the clear, nondiscretionary violation of a
ministerial duty.
113. 551 So. 2d 212, 212 (Miss. 1989).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 213-14.
116. Id. at 212.
117. Id. at 215. To find a complete lack of jurisdiction would require either finding no legal basis for all
of the plaintiff s theories or finding that cleanup or supplemental jurisdiction would not be available even if one
or more claims were sufficient to support equity jurisdiction. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing cleanup or
supplemental jurisdiction in chancery court). While the majority opinion persuasively reveals the weakness of
the plaintiff's theories, it hardly shows that they fail as a matter of law. The dissent identified grounds for
equitable jurisdiction. Tillotson, 551 So. 2d at 220 (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting).
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authority in chancery court, but rather by the fact that proceedings in chancery
court would deprive the newspaper of its right to trial by jury.118
The court offered further clarification in Southern Leisure Homes, Inc. v.
Hardin, a case where prospective buyers of a mobile home sued the seller in
chancery court for breach of contract and fraud, seeking actual and punitive
damages.119 The defendants moved to dismiss or transfer to circuit court on the
ground that all the claims were legal and chancery court lacked jurisdiction.12 0
When the chancellor refused to dismiss or transfer, the defendants sought
interlocutory review.121
The Mississippi Supreme Court granted the defendants' appeal, explaining
that interlocutory appeal was the proper way to challenge the jurisdictional error
because section 147 would prevent the issue from being appealable after a final
decree.12 2 As the issue was raised on interlocutory appeal, the constitutional bar
did not prevent the court's review of the issue.123 The court then concluded that
the chancery court's refusal to transfer was erroneous as a matter of law. The
court characterized the action as "clearly legal in nature."1 24  While
acknowledging that chancery courts have concurrent jurisdiction over some legal
claims, including the discretion to award legal and punitive damages, "as long as
the chancery court's jurisdiction has attached," the court saw no such basis for
chancery court jurisdiction.125 The claims, as described by the court, were for
breach of contract and fraud, with demands for purely legal relief in the form of
actual and punitive damages.126
Significantly, the court provided an additional reason for its decision that
might be seen as an alternative ground. While concluding that the action was
legal, it also wrote, "even assuming that some doubt existed in this regard, it is
apparent that this doubt should be resolved in favor of [defendant's] position."' 2 7
The reason offered for resolving uncertainty in favor of transfer was to preserve
the state constitutional right to trial by jury that would not be available in
chancery court, or would be available solely at the chancery judge's discretion
and with a purely advisory function.12 8 The court noted "the present case is
118. Tillotson, 551 So. 2d at 215. The court characterized the failure to dismiss or transfer as an "abuse
of discretion" (rather than error of law), suggesting the error may not have been jurisdictional. Id. at 218 (citing
Robertson v. Evans, 400 So. 2d 1214, 1214 (Miss. 1981)). It reasoned, "There is good reason why we ought
heed the Newspaper's arguments . . . . The Newspaper has demanded its right to trial by jury. If this action is
allowed to remain in chancery court, there will be no trial by jury." Id. at 215.
119. 742 So. 2d 1088, 1089 (Miss. 1999).
120. Id. Justice Robertson discussed the curious history of the unavailability of punitive damages in
Mississippi chancery court in Tideway Oil Programs, Inc., v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 467 (Miss. 1983), where
the Mississippi Supreme Court held that punitive damages are available for claims properly within the chancery
court's jurisdiction.
121. Southern Leisure Homes, Inc.,742 So. 2d at 1089.
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Robertson v. Evans, 400 So. 2d 1214 (Miss. 1981); McLean v. Green, 352 So. 2d 1312
(Miss. 1977)).
124. Id. at 1090.
125. Id. (citing Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454 (Miss. 1983)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1090-91 (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Hasty, 360 So. 2d 925, 927 (Miss. 1978)).
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essentially a breach of contract case which is best heard in circuit court."1 29 And
it wrote expansively that "in cases in which some doubt exists as to whether a
complaint is legal or equitable in nature, the better practice is to try the case in
circuit court."1 30
The court's broad language must be understood in the context of the
specific issue that the court confronted. The issue was whether the claims
arising from fraud contained any basis for equitable relief In other words, the
issue was whether a particular kind of claim could be characterized as equitable
at all-and thus support concurrent jurisdiction over mixed claims. The issue
was not whether some admittedly mixed questions of law and equity should be
transferred to circuit court as the better or more appropriate forum.
As a matter of archival history, it may be questionable whether the court
correctly characterized claims relating to fraud as lying outside equity
jurisdiction.131 But as a matter of logic, policy, and justice, the court was
certainly correct to find that esoteric claims to equity jurisdiction should be
rejected in order to prevent the collapse of the constitutional division of labor
between circuit and chancery courts and to preserve the right to trial by jury.
Subsequent cases considering challenges to chancery court jurisdiction have
followed a similar pattern. Without always carefully examining the merits of the
arguments supporting equity jurisdiction, which might theoretically support
chancery jurisdiction over related common law claims, the Mississippi Supreme
Court has found a lack of chancery jurisdiction. At the same time the court has
supported its preference for circuit court in these types of cases by the general
principle announced in Southern Leisure Homes, Inc.132 that in cases of
uncertainty, trial in circuit court is preferable. In some cases, the court has
bolstered this argument by reasoning that trial in circuit court preserves the right
to trial by jury. 133 Because the court has offered multiple reasons in support of
transfer in these cases, it was not entirely clear whether chancery courts were
required to transfer such actions because of a complete failure of jurisdiction or
whether they were required to do so because judicial discretion required transfer
to circuit court as the forum better able to handle the cases.
Justice Mills treated the classification problem similarly in Burnette v.
Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co., where the Mississippi Supreme Court also
required the transfer of an action from chancery to circuit court.134  He
concluded from the pleadings that the claims were legal rather than equitable,
but he also reasoned that any uncertainty should be resolved in favor of transfer
to circuit court, relying specifically on the right to trial by jury. 135 In Burnette,
129. Id. at 1090.
130. Id.
131. Justice Story devoted two chapters to equity jurisdiction over disputes involving fraud. See
generally 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE chs. 6-7, at 194-421 (1836).
132. See supra text accompanying note 130.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 118, 127-128; see also infra text accompanying notes 148, 154,
163-64, 188.
134. 770 So. 2d 948, 952 (Miss. 2000).
135. "We find that the present case is legal in nature. However, even if some doubt existed in this regard,
that doubt would be resolved in favor of the [plaintiff's argument for transfer] . . . . This case must be
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the plaintiffs brought the action in chancery court in February and new counsel
moved to transfer it to circuit court in October.13 6 The chancery judge denied
the motion to transfer finding that the court had jurisdiction and that the motion
was not timely.13 7 The plaintiffs did not appeal, but two months later, after
Southern Leisure Homes clarified the law, the plaintiffs filed for rehearing.13 8
On rehearing, the chancellor again denied the motion to transfer, now on the sole
ground that it was untimely, and the supreme court reversed.139
Burnette illustrates the difficulty of classifying a case on the pleadings and
confirms the court's wisdom in providing alternative grounds for its decision.
The plaintiffs alleged bad faith breach of an insurance contract and sought a
declaratory judgment and actual and punitive damages.14 0 The underlying
theory might have been conceptualized as a tort or a contract, and the declaratory
relief might have been classified either as a prohibition of future wrongful
behavior or as a recognition of the continuing existence of a valid contract.
Justice Mills avoided potentially fruitless analytic classification. He emphasized
instead that declaratory judgments are jurisdictionally neutrall41 and cited the
rule from Southern Leisure Homes that breach of contract claims are best heard
in circuit court and punitive damages claims were legal rather than equitable.142
The court faced another case presenting an apparent mix of legal and
equitable claims in Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Smith.143 The plaintiff brought an
action in chancery court, and, although the facts are not clear, the case appears to
have arisen from a dispute between a retail service operator and a supplier of
parts.144 Justice McRae's opinion focused closely on the plaintiff s theory of the
case. Of eight counts in the complaint, the first seven sought damages for
various theories of breach of contract and tort, while the eighth sought an
accounting related to a dispute over the plaintiffs use of inventory.145
Because the plaintiff defended chancery jurisdiction over the entire case
based on its jurisdiction over the accounting claim, Justice McRae examined that
claim. He concluded that an accounting was not appropriate and that the
accounting claim was a pretext for invoking chancery court jurisdiction.146 This
required transfer: "The demand for an accounting is a mask to assert chancery
court jurisdiction as it was in Tillotson, where this Court found that '[i]t is the
transferred to circuit court so that the [plaintiffs'] right to a jury trial will be effectively honored." Id. at 952.
136. Id at 950. See infra Section IV.A.3 (discussing problem of waiver).
137. Burnette, 770 So. 2d at 950.
138. Id
139. Id at 951.
140. Id at 950.
141. Id at 952. The defendant had a persuasive argument that declaratory judgments were within
chancery court's historic equity jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the court was prudent to avoid giving jurisdictional
significance to the claim for declaratory relief. The ease with which a claim for declaratory relief can be added
to virtually any other claim would permit parties to manipulate jurisdiction through artful pleading.
142. Id at 950-51(citing Southern Leisure Homes v. Hardin, 742 So. 2d 1088, 1090 (Miss. 1999)). For
the change in the court's position on punitive damages, see supra note 120.
143. 854 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Miss. 2003).
144. Id
145. Id.
146. Id at 1049.
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substance of the action that should be controlling on this issue, not its form or
label."'1 47  As in Tillotson, Justice McRae offered a second reason for
transferring: "By failing to transfer the cause to the circuit court, the Chancellor
denied the defendants their right to a jury trial."1 48
3. Transfer of Cases to Circuit Court Where Multiple Cases Were Filed and
Chancery Court Lost Jurisdiction by Prior Transfer
In contrast to the previous cases where there was no basis for original
jurisdiction in chancery court or where the chancery court's jurisdiction was
uncertain, the dispute in Burch v. Land Partners, L.P. stemmed from a land
development agreement where chancery jurisdiction would be expected.149
Apparently seeking to prevent the transfer of vacant lots to third persons, the
plaintiff commenced an action in chancery court that seemed to fall well within
the traditional bounds of equity because, although the plaintiff demanded actual
and punitive damages, he also sought specific performance.150 Meanwhile, the
defendant commenced a parallel proceeding in circuit court, and each party
moved to transfer the action in which they were named as defendant.151 The
chancery court granted the transfer while the circuit court denied it, and after the
chancery court granted a motion to reconsider, the supreme court granted
interlocutory review of the proceedings in both courts.152 First, the supreme
court held that the chancery court lost jurisdiction when it granted the transfer, so
it lacked authority to entertain the motion for reconsideration.153 Second, it
affirmed the circuit court decision to retain the case in order to preserve the right
to trial by jury. 154
4. Transfer of Cases to Circuit Court Where Chancery Court Jurisdiction
Appears to Exist or is Clear
In Union National Life Insurance Co. v. Crosby,155 hundreds of plaintiffs
brought a suit in chancery court against insurance companies, alleging fraudulent
and predatory practices. 156 Claiming the insurance companies sold worthless
and overpriced policies, the plaintiffs sought an injunction, accounting,
147. Id. (quoting Tillotson v. Anders, 551 So. 2d 212, 214 (Miss. 1989)).
148. Id. at 1050. Justice McRae did not address the additional argument that he request for punitive
damages created a separate ground for t ansfer to circuit court. Id.
149. 784 So. 2d 925, 926 (Miss. 2001).
150. Id. at 926-27.
151. Id. at 927.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 928. See supra note 97.
154. Burch, 784 So. 2d at 929. The court responded to arguments that focused on the right to trial by jury
rather than the superior jurisdiction of circuit court, but it did observe, "The circuit court is more adept to
handle equity cases, rather than the chancery court to handle legal claims." Id. at 928-29. Nevertheless, it is
hard to see why the specific enforcement of a land sale contract would not fit well within the category of cases
that Justice Chandler would later describe as traditionally associated with chancery court. See Derr Planation v.
Swarek, 14 So. 3d 711, 717 (Miss. 2006) (observing that land sale contracts were traditionally specifically
enforced in chancery court).
155. 870 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (Miss. 2004).
156. Id.
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constructive trust, and actual and punitive damages under various contract and
tort theories.157 On interlocutory review of the chancellor's denial of a motion
to transfer, the court held that the case must be transferred to circuit court.158
The court separately considered the various legal theories of the plaintiffs and
found that each one was more appropriate in circuit court.159 Most were forms
of torts or breaches of duties arising from a contractual relationship that were
plainly within circuit court jurisdiction and that the court determined were better
heard in circuit court.160
Although the court could have rested its decision on the superiority of the
circuit court to decide all claims, it went further, concluding that the individual
equitable claims should also be transferred on their own right. Conceding that
the constructive trust claim was equitable, the court reasoned that the claim
required either a void contract or a breach, and because contract laims generally
were within circuit court jurisdiction, "these claims are properly heard in circuit
court.1l61 The court also held that the request for an injunction did not create a
proper basis for chancery court jurisdiction because "Crosby has not shown that
a circuit court cannot grant the injunctive relief she seeks."1 62
The court reached the right result in Crosby, but its attempt to sort each
claim as either legal or equitable was problematic. Its suggestion that
constructive trusts and injunctions may lie beyond chancery court jurisdiction
rests on a misunderstanding of the chancery court's equity jurisdiction and is
unlikely to be followed. Nevertheless, the Crosby court's general preference for
circuit court jurisdiction over cases that include a mix of claims, including ones
within equity jurisdiction, is sound. If imprecise about equity,163 the opinion
was clear sighted in its understanding that the real problem was the conflict
between respect for the plaintiffs choice of forum and respect for the
defendant's right to trial by jury. Public policy favoring plaintiff choice of
forum does not outweigh the right to jury trial. 164
157. Id. at 1178-79.
158. Id. at 1178.
159. Id. at 1182.
160. Id. at 1179-82.
161. Id. at 1181.
162. Id.
163. The court's analysis reflected an effort to link jurisdiction to the legal source of rights, placing torts
and contracts generally in circuit court. This is evident also in the conclusion that because the action "sounds
in tort and contract, we find that the chancellor erred in denying [the defense] motion to transfer to circuit
court." Id. at 1182. On the contrary, a claim "sounding" in tort or contract but seeking specific performance or
an injunction was historically a matter in equity. Similarly, the opinion suggested that claims for equitable
relief were not properly in chancery court because the availability of such relief required establishing that the
contract was void. Id. at 1181. But the legal source of a right or the presence of a common law defense would
not eliminate equity jurisdiction. Other jurisdictions have struggled with the proper classification of quasi-
contractual restitution as legal or equitable. See generally Caprice Roberts, The Restitution Revival and the
Ghosts of Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1027, 1043-44 (2011) ("Restitution has a sordid past because it has
existed remedially as legal, equitable, and sometimes both. One should not mistakenly assume that restitution
liability or remedies are inherently equitable."). Neither, of course, should one assume such relief is legal (as
the lower court apparently did).
164. Crosby, 870 So. 2d at 181.
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In Copiah Medical Associates v. Mississippi Baptist Health Systems, the
court reviewed litigation stemming from the termination of a planned long-term
business relationship between a partnership of doctors, a health care corporation,
and a related entity, involving the lease and operation of two clinics.165 When
the corporation notified the doctors it was terminating the lease, the doctors sued
in circuit court for breach of contract.16 6 The health care corporation then sued
the doctors in chancery court, seeking specific enforcement of the lease.167 The
circuit court denied the corporation's motion to dismiss or transfer to chancery
court.168 A week later the doctors moved the chancery court to transfer the case
to circuit court, and the chancery court denied the motion.169
With two parallel cases scheduled for trial, the supreme court granted
interlocutory review of the chancery court's decision not to transfer.17 0 The
supreme court reversed and remanded with orders to transfer to circuit court.17 1
The starting point for Justice Carlson's explanation was his conviction that "this
breach of contract claim should have been brought in circuit court rather than
chancery court . ."172 The context makes clear that Justice Carlson was
addressing the claim of the breach of the fifteen-year lease for which, he
explains, specific performance would not be appropriate.173 But he also writes
more broadly that the issue is whether circuit or chancery court is "the more
appropriate forum to decide the underlying breach of contract claim. [And he
finds] . . . that the suit unquestionably sounds in contract law instead of equity
and that the chancellor erred when he denied the motion to transfer."1 74
The court's explanation leaves the impression that the court concluded the
chancery court lacked jurisdiction-despite claims for an accounting, declaratory
judgment, specific performance, and violations of fiduciary duties.175 The idea
that chancery courts lacked jurisdiction is also communicated by the
observation: "We have consistently advised our trial courts that one must look at
the substance, and not the form, of a claim to determine whether the claim is
legal or equitable."'76
165. 898 So. 2d 656, 658-60 (Miss. 2005).
166. Id. at 658. The partners amended the complaint to add claims for breach of good faith and fair
dealing, breach of fiduciary duties, punitive damages, and fees. Id. They also deleted a request for specific
performance contained in the original complaint. Id.
167. Id. at 659. The doctors responded by seeking to amend the complaint in circuit court to add a
request for a declaratory judgment declaring void the lease that was the subject of the chancery court
proceeding. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. Further procedural details include the alth care corporation's filing of a counterclaim for an
accounting in the circuit court action. Id.
170. Id. at 158-59.
171. Id. at 664.
172. Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 660 (distinguishing Osborne v. Bullins, 549 So. 2d 1337, 1340 (Miss. 1989) (specific
performance appropriate for breach of land sale contract)).
174. Id. at 656.
175. Id. at 658-59.
176. Id. at 661 (citing Trustmark Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 865 So. 2d 1148, 1152 (Miss. 2004); Briggs &
Stratton Corp. v. Smith, 854 So. 2d 1045, 1049 (Miss. 2003); Tillotson v. Anders, 551 So. 2d 212, 214 (Miss.
1989); Thompson v. First Miss. Nat'l Bank, 427 So. 2d 973, 976 (Miss. 1983); Dixie Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
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Nevertheless, Justice Carlson seemed to acknowledge the possibility of
concurrent jurisdiction when he framed the issue as "whether the chancery court
is the more appropriate forum for the present action."1 7 7 And he likewise
assumed concurrent jurisdiction in providing as additional reasons for transfer
the fact that the chancery court claims should have been raised as compulsory
counterclaims in circuit court, and that the circuit court had "priority
jurisdiction." 78
In ERA Franchise Systems, Inc. v. Mathis, both the majority and dissenting
opinions agreed that the circuit court had jurisdiction over mixed questions of
equity and law. 179 The plaintiff sued in chancery court, asserting his own claims
and derivative claims on behalf of Real Estate Professionals, LLC for various
torts, breaches of contract, and breaches of fiduciary duties.180 The plaintiff
sought a constructive trust, specific performance, and actual and punitive
damages.181 The chancellor denied the defendant's motion to transfer to circuit
court and announced he would bifurcate the case, first ruling on all equitable
claims and then transferring any remaining legal issues to circuit court.182
The supreme court granted interlocutory review and reversed, requiring the
case to be transferred to circuit court.183 In the majority opinion, Justice Waller
acknowledged the concurrent jurisdiction of circuit and chancery courts over
mixed questions of law and equity, but he emphasized the preference for
litigating mixed questions in circuit court:
While we have allowed a chancery court to retain jurisdiction
over cases involving questions of both law and equity, our more
recent cases have held that equitable claims are more
appropriately brought before a circuit court when they are
connected to a contractual relationship or other claims tied to
questions of law. 184
Justice Waller noted that doubt should be resolved in favor of
characterizing a case as legal rather than equitable.18 5 He identified factors that
supported circuit court jurisdiction: the primary issues arose from contractual
Allison, 372 So. 2d 1081, 1085 (Miss. 1979)).
177. Id. at 660.
178. Id. at 663 ("This Court has repeatedly stated that it is a 'well established rule in this jurisdiction that
where two (2) suits between the same parties over the same controversy are brought in courts of concurrent
jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction retains jurisdiction over the whole controversy to the
exclusion or abatement of the second suit."' (quoting In re Petition of Beggiani, 519 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (Miss.
1988))).
179. 931 So. 2d 1278, 1282-84 (Miss. 2006).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1280.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1279, 1284.
184. Id. at 1283 (citing Copiah Med. Assocs. v. Miss. Baptist Health Sys., 898 So. 2d 656, 659 (Miss.
2005); Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 870 So. 2d 1175, 1175 (Miss. 2004); RE/Max Real Estate Partners
v. Lindsley, 840 So. 2d 709, 712 (Miss. 2003)).
185. Id. at 1282 (citing Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 So. 2d 948, 952 (Miss. 2000)).
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relations, and breach of contract was "best heard" in circuit court;186 the request
for punitive damages indicated that the action was legal rather than equitable;187
and proceedings in chancery court would deprive the defendant of its right to a
jury trial. 18
8
Justice Graves dissented.189 He emphasized that claims for an accounting,
constructive trust, and specific performance were not pretextual and clearly
established chancery court jurisdiction.190 This, for the dissent, supported the
exercise of "pendent" (cleanup or supplemental) jurisdiction by the chancery
court over the entire action.191 Justice Graves identified a paradox behind the
majority's reasoning: "The majority takes the position that because some of
Mathis' claims are legal in nature, all of his claims must be adjudicated in circuit
court. This position ignores prior decisions of this Court which allow Chancery
courts to adjudicate pendent legal claims once original equity jurisdiction has
been established."192 Justice Graves found that no additional factors required
transfer. He reasoned that chancery courts had jurisdiction to award punitive
damages,193 and because the chancery court had jurisdiction, no jury trial was
required, and therefore the lack of a jury trial would violate no right.194 Finally,
Justice Graves emphasized that requiring transfer gave inadequate weight to the
plaintiffs choice of forum.195
The opinions in Copiah Medical Associates and ERA Franchise Systems
indicate that the supreme court, while often characterizing the choice between
circuit and chancery courts as "either-or," was in fact moving towards the
position that both courts might have jurisdiction but circuit court's was
preferred. The decisions also evidenced an unmistakable reluctance to permit
parties to split cases to allow them to proceed simultaneously in two courts.
The court followed a similar approach in Tyson Breeders, Inc. v.
Harrison.196 In that case, a farmer entered into a contract with a chicken
breeding company under which the company was to provide hens, supplies, and
instructions for producing eggs in accordance with company policy.197 When
the company removed all chickens without notice, the farmer commenced an
action in chancery court seeking specific performance, injunctive relief, and
186. Id. at 1283.
187. Id. at 1282 (citing Crosby, 870 So. 2d at 1179).
188. Id. at 1283.
189. Id. at 1284 (Graves, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1284-89 (acknowledging that courts "should 'be wary' of pretextual claims asserted to
invoke chancery jurisdiction (citing Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Smith, 854 So. 2d 1045, 1049 (Miss. 2003))).
191. Id.at 1284-85 (citing RE/Max Real Estate Partners v. Lindsley, 840 So. 2d 709, 712 (Miss. 2003)
(recognizing cleanup or supplemental jurisdiction and requiring litigation in chancery court)). See infra Part
III.B. 1 (discussing cleanup or supplemental jurisdiction in chancery court).
192. ERA Franchise Systems, Inc, 931 So. 2d at 1284 (Graves, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 1288 (citing RE/Max Real Estate Partners, 840 So. 2d at 712; Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v.
Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 459 (Miss. 1983) ("Because chancery court jurisdiction attached to [the plaintiffs]
claims for an accounting, constructive trust, and specific performance, it follows that the chancery court has
authority to award both compensatory and punitive damages in the instant case.")).
194. Id. at 1288-89 (citing RE/Max Real Estate Partners, 840 So. 2d at 713-14).
195. Id. (citing RE/Max Real Estate Partners, 840 So. 2d at 713).
196. 940 So. 2d 230 (Miss. 2006).
197. Id. at 231.
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actual and punitive damages.198 The company moved to transfer to circuit court
on the grounds that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction and that transfer was
required to preserve the right to trial by jury.1 99 After the chancery court found
that it had jurisdiction, the company moved for summary judgment.200 The
chancery court granted partial summary judgment to the farmer, finding that the
company breached the contract, and the chancery court transferred the case to
circuit court for determination of damages.2 01
On interlocutory review, the supreme court reversed.202 First, it found that
"breach of contract issues are best heard in circuit court."20 3 It repeated the
principle that "[i]n cases in which some doubt exists as to whether a complaint is
legal or equitable in nature, the better practice is to try the case in circuit
court."'204 The court also cited the principle that "it is more appropriate for a
circuit court to hear equity claims than it is for a chancery court o hear actions at
law since circuit courts have general jurisdiction but chancery courts enjoy only
limited jurisdiction."2 05  The court acknowledged cases to the contrary but
repeated its policy:
Although the Court has previously allowed a chancery court o
retain jurisdiction over cases involving questions of both law
and equity, more recent cases hold that equitable claims are
more appropriately brought before a circuit court when they are
connected to a contractual relationship or other claims tied to
questions of law.206
Chief Justice Smith's opinion for the court reasoned that the prior cases
requiring transfer established that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over
contract actions for damages.20 7 This led the court to reverse the chancery
court's partial summary judgment,2 08 leaving the entire case to be adjudicated de
novo in circuit court.
The court expressly recognized the concurrent jurisdiction of circuit and
chancery courts over mixed cases of law and equity in RAS Family Partners v.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 231-32.
200. Id. at 232.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 232-34.
203. Id. at 233 (citing Southern Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So. 2d 1088, 1089-90 (Miss. 1999)).
204. Id. (citing Southern Leisure Homes, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 1089-90).
205. Id. (quoting Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 870 So. 2d 1175, 1182 (Miss. 2004)).
206. Id. (citing ERA Franchise Sys. v. Mathis, 931 So. 2d 1278, 1282-83 (Miss. 2006)). See supra text
accompanying note 184.
207. Tyson Breeders, Inc., 940 So. 2d at 234 ("In Copiah, Crosby and Mathis, we have confirmed the
lack of jurisdiction in chancery court and the exclusive jurisdiction in circuit court in each of the breach of
contract cases, and accordingly order the transfer of each case to circuit court.") (citing Copiah Med. Assocs. v.
Miss. Baptist Health Sys., 898 So. 2d 656 (Miss. 2005); Crosby, 870 So. 2d at 1175; ERA Franchise Sys., 931
So. 2d at 1278)).
208. Id. at 233-34 ("Having found that the chancery court lacked proper jurisdiction to hear Harrison's
breach of contract claim, Harrison was thus not entitled to judgment as a matter of law concerning those
claims.").
2017] 409
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Onnam Biloxi, LLC. 209 Landowners who also owned stock in a corporation that
owned adjacent land had entered into an agreement with a casino operator to
lease land and sell stock.2 10 Hurricane Katrina struck the day before the
closing.211 When the casino operator later sought to enforce the agreement, the
property owners brought a civil action in circuit court seeking a declaratory
judgment that the contracts were unenforceable and for damages.2 12 The casino
operator then sued in chancery court seeking specific performance of the lease
agreement and damages for breach of the contract to sell stock.2 13
The court granted interlocutory review of decisions by both the circuit and
chancery courts not to transfer. In holding that litigation was required in circuit
court, Justice Diaz rejected the casino operator's argument that the circuit court
lacked jurisdiction over equity claims.2 14 He explained that in evaluating the
claims, the court should examine the pleadings,2 15 and he rejected the argument
that the case should be transferred to chancery court because the "paramount
claim" was for specific performance, calling it "without merit."2 16 There was no
suggestion that the equity claims were pretextual or frivolous.2 17 And the court
confined its analysis to the preliminary question of whether jurisdiction was
appropriate in circuit court, without attempting to identify what claims were
more important for the parties.2 18 Finding the circuit court had competent
jurisdiction over all claims, the court then turned to the issue of whether the
circuit court retained jurisdiction over all claims because the case was first filed
there.2 19 Noting that priority jurisdiction was a well-established principle under
Mississippi law when cases were filed in multiple courts with concurrent
jurisdiction,220 Justice Diaz held that the chancery court case should be
transferred to circuit court.2 2 1
209. 968 So. 2d 926 (Miss. 2007).
210. Id. at 927.
211. Id.
212. Id. The casino operator previously commenced an action in federal court, which was dismissed. Id.
at 926. The property owner's claim for damages included a theory of wrongful filing of a lis pendens. Id.
213. Id.
214. See supra text accompanying note 100.
215. RAS Family Partners, LP, 968 So. 2d at 928 ("To determine whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction, we look to the face of the complaint, examining the nature of the controversy and the relief sought
(citations omitted). If the complaint seeks legal relief, even in combination with equitable relief, the circuit
court can have proper subject matter jurisdiction." (citation omitted)).
216. Id. at 929. Priority is determined by the dates of filing, provided that service of process is obtained





221. Id. The priority rule was applied to encompass a party who was subsequently added to the circuit
court action by amendment under the theory that the amendment related back to the time of commencement. Id.
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B. The Power of Chancery Courts to Hear Cases that Raise Mixed Questions of
Law and Equity
1. Cleanup or Supplemental Jurisdiction
Chancery courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate purely common law claims,
even when those claims are cast in the guise of a request for equitable relief.222
Nevertheless, the chancellor in England, when deciding cases within his
equitable jurisdiction, was competent to provide additional relief that would
normally be available only in common law courts.22 3 American legal authorities
likewise recognized the power of equity courts to provide additional legal
relief-specifically money damages.224 This power is commonly referred to as
the "equitable cleanup" doctrine in other jurisdictions,22 5 and it is analogous to
the supplemental jurisdiction exercised by federal courts.22 6 Mississippi courts
apparently have neither employed the jargon of "equitable cleanup"22 7 nor
developed elaborate rules to guide the discretionary exercise of judicial power
under the doctrine as have other states.22 8 But the doctrine has a long history in
222. See supra text accompanying notes 101-05.
223. See generally A. Leo Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100 PENN.
L. REV. 333 (1951); William Draper Lewis, Damages Given in Equity in Lieu of a Specific Performance, 50
AM. L. REG. 394, 395 (1901) (discussing English cases). The reluctance of the chancellor to exercise this
power led Parliament to enact a statute specifically authorizing the chancellor to award damages "either in
addition to or in substitution for ... [an] injunction or specific performance." 21 & 22 Vict., c. 27, § 2 (1858),
quoted by LEVIN, supra, at 332. There was-and is-confusion about whether it is appropriate for a court of
equity to provide a legal remedy when equitable relief is unavailable. Levin argues persuasively that he key to
understanding the opinions hinges on the specific facts that explain why equitable relief is unavailable. For
example, a defendant who makes himself incapable of rendering specific performance after the filing of a
lawsuit should be compelled to pay damages. In contrast, a plaintiff who knowingly brings a claim for specific
performance against a party incapable of performing should not be able to circumvent the normal limits on
equity and recover damages. Consistent with the trend of cases to remove restrictions on legal relief, Levin
proposed that the cleanup rule should apply "wherever the award of damages will not perpetrate the very
injustice which denial of specific performance is intended to prevent." LEVIN, supra, at 351.
224. E.g., JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA § 181, 231, (5th ed., Spencer W. Symons ed., 1941); STORY, supra note 131, § 64. From the
beginning, exercise of the power to provide legal relief presented the question of whether a jury or judge should
decide the quantity of damages. See generally, LEVIN, supra note 223, at 320.
Some later Mississippi cases opine that contracts lie peculiarly outside equity jurisdiction, but Story discussed
the jurisdiction of equity courts to provide damages in cases seeking specific performance or other forms of
equitable relief. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 798-99, at 122-23 (3d ed. 1843).
225. E.g., In re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.); State ex rel Leonardi v.
Sherry, 137 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Mo. 2004); Stokes v. Stokes, 491 S.W.3d 113, 118 n.3 (Ark. 2016); see
generally Tabitha G. Davisson, Note, Right to a Jury Trial for Legal Claims: Does the Equitable Cleanup
Doctrine Make Sense in Missouri?, 70 MO. L. REV. 609 (2005).
226. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The term "supplemental jurisdiction" was adopted by the statute instead of
"pendent "or "ancillary jurisdiction," the terms courts had previously employed.
227. Members of the court have variously referred to the supplemental power and obligation of the
chancery court to provide legal remedies as concurrent jurisdiction, e.g., Atkinson v. Felder, 29 So. 767, 767
(Miss. 1900), and pendent jurisdiction, e.g., Tideway Oil Programs, Inc., v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 464 (Miss.
1983).
228. See, e.g., Sherry, 137 S.W.3d at 462 (discussing history of equity cleanup cases in Missouri). See
generally John E. Sanchez, Jury Trials in Hybrid and Non-Hybrid Actions: The Equitable Clean-Up Doctrine
in the Guise of Inseparability and Other Analytical Problems, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 627 (1989); Davisson, supra
note 225; B.C. Ricketts, Annotation, Right in Equity Suit to Jury Trial of Counterclaim Involving Legal Issue,
17 A.L.R.3d 1321 (1968).
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the state, and in the 1980s some justices began to refer to it as pendent
jurisdiction.229
In Atkinson v. Felder, an early case under the 1890 Mississippi
Constitution, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for
the chancellor to refuse to exercise concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate closely
related legal claims.230  Moreover, the court held that the chancellor was
required to exercise such jurisdiction over legal matters even while sustaining
the chancellor's ruling that no equitable relief was available on the merits.231
The court stated the principle broadly:
It is a principle relating to the concurrent jurisdiction of courts
that, when there is a distinct and equitable feature belonging to
the case, and the chancery court has taken jurisdiction of the
case in consequence of such a feature or incident, it will
adjudicate all the rights of the parties touching the subject-
matter of the litigation.... And the fact that the equitable
feature of the suit is not available because of some defense
arising thereto does not preclude the court from giving a
recovery for the money claimed, though that, as it turns out, is
based upon a purely legal right. The court, having lawfully taken
jurisdiction, is entitled to proceed, and to adjust whatever ights
may exist between the parties of whatever kind, and [even
though they may be] strictly legal.232
Almost fifty years later, the Mississippi Supreme Court reconfirmed the
duty of the chancellor to provide a forum for common law claims closely related
to equity claims within chancery court jurisdiction. In McClendon v. Mississippi
State Highway Commission, some landowners alleged that the highway
commission improperly allowed a drainage ditch to become obstructed, leading
to flooding of their property. 233 They brought an action in chancery court
seeking to enjoin the nuisance and to prohibit a continuing trespass.234 They
further supported their claim to chancery jurisdiction by the need to prevent a
multiplicity of lawsuits.235 While the action was pending, the parties reached a
229. Because the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in Mississippi courts is analogous to the doctrine of
supplemental jurisdiction in the federal courts, and because the federal system no longer uses the term
"pendent" jurisdiction, this Article refers to the state doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as "cleanup" or
"supplemental" jurisdiction.
230. 29 So. 767, 767 (Miss. 1901).
231. Id. The Felders, husband and wife, signed promissory notes secured by a mortgage. Id. When they
defaulted, Atkinson commenced a foreclosure action in chancery court and also sought damages. Id. The
Felders counterclaimed, contending that Mrs. Felder lacked capacity due to insanity, and sought to have the
mortgage removed as a cloud on her title. The chancellor found for the Felders, declared the mortgage void,
and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims in full. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that it was error to dismiss
the damages claims against Mr. Felder. Id.
232. Id. Although the court might have relied solely on a specific legislative grant of jurisdiction to
award damages in foreclosure actions in chancery court, the court declined to do so.
233. McClendon v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 38 So. 2d 325, 325-26 (Miss. 1949).
234. Id. at 326.
235. Id.
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partial settlement and agreed to dismiss all claims except the claims for
damages.236 When the case came up for trial, the chancellor, seeing that only
common law issues survived, offered to either transfer the case to circuit court or
dismiss it without prejudice.237 When the parties did not respond,238 the court
dismissed, and the parties appealed. In reversing, the supreme court
acknowledged the concurrent jurisdiction of chancery courts over common law
claims related to issues within their equity jurisdiction:
It has long been settled in this state, as one of the pre-eminent
principles of equity procedure, that the Chancery Court having
taken jurisdiction on any one ground of equity, will thereupon
proceed in the one suit to a complete adjudication and settlement
of every one of the several disputed questions materially
involved in the entire transaction, awarding by a single
comprehensive decree all appropriate remedies, legal as well as
equitable.... and in this state, the rule goes even to the extent
that if the ground of equity fail under the proof, the cause may
still be retained to a complete final decree on the remaining
issues although the latter present legal subjects only.239
The chancery court clearly had original jurisdiction based on claims for
injunctive relief and the need to avoid a multiplicity of suits. Consequently, after
the claims were dismissed, "the court nevertheless still had jurisdiction to
proceed to a full and complete determination of all of the remaining issues, even
though they might cover only legal rights and require the granting of none but
legal remedies."240
In mandating the exercise of concurrent common law jurisdiction by the
chancery court, the Mississippi Supreme Court quoted the provision of the
Mississippi Constitution guaranteeing access to courts.24 1 The court held that
section 147 had no bearing as it applied solely to cases where the lower courts
had improperly refused to dismiss or transfer rather than cases where the lower
courts improperly dismissed.242
236. Id.
237. Id. at 326-27.
238. Id. at 317. The procedural posture is unclear. Id. at 325. The appellate decision says the parties
"t[ook] no action" and the chancellor dismissed. Id. at 327. It is unclear what action was required or whether
dismissal resulting from the inactivity could have constituted invited error. Id. In any event, the supreme court
addressed the matter of jurisdiction on the merits. Id.
239. Id. (citing GRIFFITH'S CHANCERY PRACTICE § 28, at 31).
240. Id. at 328.
241. Id. (quoting MISS. CONST. § 24) ("All courts shall be open; and every person for an injury done him
in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial, or delay.").
242. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Bank of Indianola, 54 So. 87 (Miss. 1911) (reversing chancery court dismissal
of claim for money damages where chancellor concluded that such relief was exclusively legal, finding both
that claim for breach of trust was properly within the chancellor's jurisdiction and that constitutional bar of
appellate review had no application to decisions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction)).
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Although the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted broad language
supporting the exercise of chancery court jurisdiction over common law claims
in Atkinson and McClendon, it would be prudent not to overlook some of the
special circumstances of those cases. First, they presented mixed questions of
law and equity in chancery courts. Second, they were cases where the original
equity jurisdiction of the chancery court was not in doubt and the availability of
equitable relief depended on the merits. Third, they were cases where
chancellors dismissed the matter absolutely rather than transferring to circuit
court. Fourth, they were cases where the chancellors dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction as a matter of law. That is, they were cases where the chancellors
refused to acknowledge the well-established existence of some form of
supplemental jurisdiction, not cases where the chancellors, recognizing such
jurisdiction, exercised discretion not to proceed. Fifth, from the laconic record
in both cases, it seems that each presented a particularly strong case for the
exercise of jurisdiction even if it were a matter of discretion: there was no reason
evident from the record not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Finally, in
neither case did any party object to supplemental jurisdiction on the grounds that
it would prevent the exercise of the right to trial by jury available in actions for
damages at common law.2 43
2. Cases Requiring Litigation in Chancery Court
In a handful of mixed jurisdiction cases, the Mississippi Supreme Court has
required litigation to proceed in chancery court. Because these decisions run
counter to the court's general preference for mixed cases to be litigated in circuit
court, they bear close consideration.
a. Cases Commenced Originally in Chancery Court
In RE/MAX Real Estate Partners v. Lindsley, a divided court held that a
case against real estate agents hould remain in chancery court even though the
complaint sought damages for breach of contract and actual and punitive
243. Some older authority suggests that issues can be so peculiarly "legal" that they lie outside the power
of equity supplemental jurisdiction. At one point chancery courts lacked jurisdiction over punitive damages
claims. In a case that presented a mix of common law and equitable issues, Justice Robertson wrote, "[W]here
there is in the case an issue of exclusive law cognizance (e.g., the punitive damages issue), the circuit court
may in its discretion retain jurisdiction and hear the entire cause, even though there may be other issues which
arguably fall within chancery court subject matter jurisdiction." Thompson v. First Nat'l Bank & Mut. Say.
Life Ins. Co., 427 So. 2d 973, 976 (Miss. 1983). The case stemmed from a debtor's claim that her debt should
be cancelled because the bank failed to insure the life of a co-debtor. Id. at 974. She sued in circuit court to
cancel the debt, seeking actual and punitive damages. Id. Claiming the action required a complex accounting,
the bank successfully transferred the action to chancery court where it was dismissed. Id. at 975. (The grounds
for dismissal are unclear.) In reversing, the Mississippi Supreme Court remanded to the circuit court. Id. at 977.
Justice Robertson identified two distinct errors (in addition to the erroneous dismissal). Id. at 975. First, though
well aware of chancery court jurisdiction over most legal claims, he insisted that the chancery court lacked
jurisdiction over the punitive damages issue. Id. He specifically reasoned that the circuit court could not confer
such jurisdiction by transfer. Id. ("The circuit court, of course, had no power to confer upon the chancery court
the power to hear punitive damage claims. Accordingly, the transfer order was in error."). Second, he reasoned
that transfer deprived the plaintiff of her right to trial by jury. Id. at 976.
Today, claims for punitive damages are no longer outside chancery court jurisdiction. See supra note 120.
Thus, the idea of exclusive common law jurisdiction may have been limited to punitive damages and may no
longer be applicable.
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damages for gross negligence in addition to cancellation and an accounting.244
The plaintiff property owner listed her property with the defendant real estate
agency, naming as the listed salesperson a woman with whom the seller was
engaged in joint real estate ventures.245 The seller alleged that the listing agent
persuaded her to transfer title to the listed property to the agent; that the agent
then borrowed $100,000 by encumbering the title with a mortgage; and that the
agent borrowed an additional $15,000 that she used for personal matters.246
Most of the funds were not repaid, and the seller could not recover the property
because the bank had foreclosed.247 Accordingly, she sought to recover the
value of funds received by the listing agent in violation of fiduciary duties and in
breach of contract, and she sought to trace these funds and recover interest
received on them as well.24 8
On interlocutory appeal from the chancery court's denial of defendants'
motion to transfer to circuit court, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed.249
Justice Diaz wrote an opinion that recognized equity jurisdiction over related
legal claims.250 He found in the claim for an accounting a firm basis for equity
jurisdiction.251 In requiring the suit to remain in chancery court, he offered two
different lines of reasoning. First, he reasoned that in a mixed case that could
have been brought in either circuit or chancery court, the plaintiffs choice of
forum should be respected.252 The plaintiffs right to select the forum was not
outweighed by the defendants' right to a jury trial.253 Second, he provided
reasons why chancery court was in fact the better forum.
In resisting transfer, the seller insisted on the need for an equitable
accounting for two reasons. She claimed the right to trace proceeds of funds into
accounts and recover them (or their value).254 Justice Diaz concluded that
chancery court was "in the best position to award appropriate relief in the form
of a constructive trust or an equitable lien, should one of those . .. be
required."255
This conclusion is open to question. The theories of fraud, breach of
contract, and unjust enrichment against the listing agent would have supported
tracing of proceeds and entitled the seller to an equitable accounting against the
listing agent. But it is not clear whether the listing agent was ever named as a
defendant.256 Rather, the seller brought claims against the agent's employers on
244. 840 So. 2d 709, 712-13 (Miss. 2003).
245. Id. at 710.
246. Id. at 710-11.
247. Id. at 711.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 711-12.
250. Id. at 714.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 713 ("Presumably with the knowledge that concurrent jurisdiction between chancery and
circuit court existed for this matter, Lindlsey chose to bring her suit for redress in chancery court. This was her
choice and, if proper and fair, must be respected here.").
253. Id.
254. Id. at 714.
255. Id.
256. The listing agent's name is not included in the style of the case on appeal, and neither the majority
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theories of negligent instruction and supervision.2 57 Although the accounting
might conceivably provide evidence of additional damages, it is by no means
clear it would do so. Nor is it clear from the facts what power the courts could
exercise to recover the funds in the hands of third persons. Nevertheless, Justice
Diaz characterized the accounting claim as "the pivotal claim by which the other
claims will be measured and by which proper relief may be granted."25 8
Four members of the court dissented,259 characterizing the lawsuit as an
action at law and rejecting the significance of the request for an accounting:
The allegations in the complaint pertain to [the listing agent's]
alleged breach of contract with Lindsley, ReMax's alleged
failure to supervise [the agent], and [the agent's] alleged
conversion of Lindsley's money, civil causes of action which are
historically filed in circuit court .... [citations omitted] A mere
request for accounting does not confer jurisdiction on the
chancery court; indeed, any needed accounting is easily
developed during discovery in circuit court.2 60
They also disagreed with Justice Diaz's view that there was concurrent
jurisdiction.261 Emphasizing that chancery courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, they concluded that the action should have been commenced in
circuit court2 62-implicitly rejecting the majority's suggestion that, in mixed
cases, the chancery court should consider the benefits of litigating in chancery
over circuit court.
In two other cases where the supreme court required litigation of mixed
cases in chancery court, Justice Carlson wrote opinions for the court that relied
in part on the fact that the cases had begun in chancery court. But there were
also other circumstances supporting the d cisions. In City of Starkville v. 4-
County Electric Power Association,2 63 the city of Starkville brought an action to
enforce a 1963 contract to purchase a power company's facilities and service
rights.2 64 After one interlocutory appeal clarified that intervening legislation did
not invalidate the contract, the legislature made further changes to the law that
supported a new defense.2 65 The city then challenged the constitutionality of the
nor dissenting opinion states that the listing agent was a party; nor does either opinion explain her absence. Id.
at 710.
257. Id. at 711. The appellate opinion lists three appellants: RE/MAX Real Estate Partners, Inc., Re-Max
Real Estate Partners, and Judith Corts. They were presumably the defendants at trial. The opinions do not
explain their relationship to each other.
258. Id. at 714.
259. Id. at 714-15 (Waller, J., dissenting) (Smith, Cobb and Carlson, JJ., joining in the opinion).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 715.
263. 909 So. 2d 1094 (Miss. 2005).
264. The action sought specific performance, declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages. Id. at 1100.
265. Id.
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new statute and sought to transfer the action to circuit court for a determination
of actual and punitive damages.266
The chancery court denied the motion to transfer and entered judgment for
the defendant, finding the purchase option unenforceable cause the city did not
obtain approval of the public service commission.267  The supreme court
affirmed.268 Justice Carlson first addressed the issue of whether the chancery
court erred in failing to transfer to circuit court.2 69 He emphasized that the city
"chose to file in chancery court (not circuit court) . . . thus commencing this
protracted litigation." 270 While acknowledging that most recent cases supported
transfer to circuit court,27 1 he observed that Trustmark National Bank v.
Johnson, a case decided the previous year, had directed courts to consider the
substance rather than the form of claims.272 Noting that specific performance
was a prominent claim and the basis of the trial court's decision not to transfer,
Justice Carlson wrote, "[S]pecific performance of a contract is typically the type
of relief to be considered by our chancellors sitting as a court of equity."273 He
also looked to two other factors. First, the city "presumably made a knowing
and conscious decision to commence this litigation in chancery court . ."274
Second, the case had been extensively litigated in chancery court, appealed once,
and then litigated to final judgment on the merits on motions for summary
judgment.27 5
In Issaquena Warren Counties Land Co. v. Warren County, Justice Carlson
also wrote the court's opinion in a decision requiring litigation of a mixed case
in chancery court.2 76  A dispute between developers and a county over
compliance with subdivision and floodplain laws led to multiple lawsuits.27 7
Over six months, the county filed twenty-three criminal charges in county court
against the individual owners of the development company.27 8 Encouraged by
the trial judge, the county dismissed the criminal charges but announced its
intention to seek civil remedies.2 79 The land company then brought an action in
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1100-1101. The chancery court postponed its decision to allow the city to seek approval from
the commission. The opinion does not explain why the city made no effort to obtain approval.
268. Id. at 1115.
269. The reason why the court considered the jurisdictional issue first-or at all-is uncertain. Because
the supreme court affirmed on the merits and the challenges to the chancery court's jurisdiction focused on its
power to decide matters of common law, the state constitution prevented the supreme court from reversing. See
supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
270. City ofStarkville, 909 So. 2d at 1101.
271. Id. at 1101-02 (citing cases).
272. Id. at 1102 (citing Trustmark National Bank v. Johnson, 865 So. 2d 1148 (Miss. 2004)); see infra
text accompanying note 338 (discussing Trustmark).
273. City ofStarkville, 909 So. 2d at 1102.
274. Id.
275. Id. "[B]ecause the chancery court had already heard extensive litigation in the case, it was certainly
in the best position to hear and resolve the relevant issues in the related case which had been commenced." Id.
(citing Rogers v. Eaves, 812 So. 2d 208, 211-12 (Miss. 2002)).
276. 996 So. 2d 747, 747 (Miss. 2008).
277. Id. at 748-49.
278. Id.
279. Id at 749.
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chancery court for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to prevent multiple
lawsuits and asking for a declaration that it had not violated county laws.280
Five days later the county commenced an action in circuit court seeking
declaratory relief and damages.281
The chancery court granted the county's motion to transfer the chancery
court proceedings to circuit court.2 82 On interlocutory appeal, the Mississippi
Supreme Court reversed.283 Justice Carlson accepted the developer's priority
jurisdiction argument, stating, "The priority-of-jurisdiction rule stands for the
premise that if the first court in which the action is filed has proper subject
matter jurisdiction, that court should retain jurisdiction over the whole
controversy."2 84 Justice Carlson found the case was properly in chancery court:
the chancery court had jurisdiction over claims for equitable relief in the
complaint and thus had "pendent" jurisdiction over related legal claims.28 5
Applying the priority jurisdiction rule, he concluded that the case was proper in
chancery court and should not have been transferred.2 86
Justice Carlson's opinion, in respecting priority of filing, did not address the
conflicting practice under which the court had expressed the strong preference
for requiring litigation of mixed cases in circuit court. It is not clear whether any
party brought the relevant legal authority to the court's attention. Nevertheless,
Justice Carlson considered the right to trial by jury that is protected by that
practice. First, he cited the familiar principle that there is no right to trial by jury




283. Id. at 751.
284. Id. at 750 (citing RAS Family Partners v. Onnam Biloxi, LLC, 968 So. 2d 926, 929 (Miss. 2007).
See also id. (quoting RAS Family Partners, 968 So. 2d at 929) (quoting Scruggs, Millette, Bozeman, & Dent,
P.A. v. Merkel and Cocke, P.A., 804 So. 2d 1000, 1006 (Miss. 2001) ("To this end, this Court has stated, '[t]he
"first to file" or "race to the courthouse" rule is well-established in Mississippi case law: "[w]here two suits
between the same parties over the same controversy are brought in courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the court
which first acquires jurisdiction retains jurisdiction over the whole controversy to the exclusion or abatement of
the second suit."'))
In Scruggs, one law firm brought a civil action in chancery court against other law firms to determine the right
to attorneys' fees resulting from other litigation. 804 So. 2d at 1002. One of the defendant firms waited six
months and then filed an interpleader action in chancery court in another county, attempting to interplead part
of the fees that were at issue in the prior lawsuit. Id. The second chancery court refused to transfer and entered
a decision relating to the interpleaded funds that was certified as a final judgment. Id. The Mississippi
Supreme Court reversed the judgment. Id. at 1003. It found that the interpleader action was a compulsory
counterclaim under Miss. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Id. It then applied the priority-ofjurisdiction rule in finding that the
second chancery court erred in failing to dismiss or transfer. Id. at 1006. There was no question that both
chancery courts had concurrent subject matter jurisdiction. Id. "This Court has repeatedly stated that it is a
'well established rule in this jurisdiction that where two (2) suits between the same parties over the same
controversy are brought in courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction retains
jurisdiction over the whole controversy to the exclusion or abatement of the second suit."' Id. (quoting In re
Beggiani, 519 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (Miss. 1988)). See supra note 178 (quoting same passage).
285. Issaquena, 996 So. 2d at 751.
286. Id. (Chancery court "has priority jurisdiction to the exclusion and abatement of the complaint filed
in [circuit] [c]ourt."). The fact that the demand for legal relief was first raised in the action in circuit court after
the commencement of the suit in chancery court did not affect the outcome.
287. Id. (citing Tillotson v. Anders, 551 So. 2d 212, 213 (Miss. 1989); Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v.
Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 464 (Miss. 1983); Burnett v. Bass, 120 So. 456, 456 (Miss. 1929)).
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for by statute.28 8 Accordingly, the amount of damages was fixed as a matter of
law and could be easily applied by the chancellor.2 89 Thus, a jury trial would be
unnecessary.2 90
In Derr Plantation, Inc. v. Swarek, the Mississippi Supreme Court again
required a case with mixed legal and equitable claims to remain in chancery
court where the plaintiff originally brought it.291 Would-be buyers alleged
breach of a contract to lease and sell a large operational farm and sought specific
performance, a preliminary injunction, and compensatory and punitive
damages.29 2 Over two years later, after the chancery court had denied motions
for summary judgment, the plaintiffs were no longer interested in specific
performance and moved to transfer the action for damages to circuit court.29 3
The chancery judge granted the motion and the defendant sought an
interlocutory appeal.294
The supreme court reversed, publishing two opinions explaining why the
case must remain in chancery court.2 95 Justice Chandler carefully reviewed the
court's practice in prior cases and relied on the outcome and reasoning in the
most closely analogous case:
As in City of Starkville, the chancery court acquired jurisdiction
over the Swareks' complaint because the fundamental nature of
their claim was for the equitable remedy of specific
performance; additionally, the chancellor has presided over the
matter through discovery and dispositive motions and she is thus
well-positioned to fairly and correctly decide the issues to be
tried.29 6
His opinion is notable for its careful review of the court's divergent
practices in prior cases and its effort to harmonize the result with each. He
summarized the applicable rules. First, subject matter jurisdiction of the
288. Id .
289. Id.
290. Id. ("Putting on proof before a jury as to damages would be unnecessary where the amount properly
provided for pursuant to the ordinance is fixed.").
291. 14 So. 3d 711, 720 (Miss. 2006). Co-author Hoffheimer consulted with the lawyers representing the
Swareks at a later stage of the proceedings regarding a different legal issue. Co-author Challener consulted with
the lawyers representing Derr Plantation at a later stage of the proceedings regarding a different legal issue.
292. Id. at 713.
293. Id. at 716.
294. Id. at 713.
295. Id. at 720. The decision to reverse was unanimous, with all justices except Justice Dickinson
participating. Justices Waller, Carlson, Lamar, Kitchens, and Pierce concurred in Justice Chandler's opinion.
Justice Graves concurred in the result only. Justice Randolph specially concurred in an opinion in which Justice
Chandler and other justices concurred (except Justice Kitchens) and in which Justice Graves concurred in part.
In other words a supermajority of justices agreed with the reasoning offered in both opinions. There is no
indication of why Justices Randolph and Graves did not concur in Justice Chandler's opinion, or of why Justice
Kitchens did not concur in Justice Randolph's.
296. Id. at 718 (citing City of Starkville v. 4-County Elec. Power Ass'n, 909 So. 2d 1094, 1101 (Miss.
2005)).
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chancery court may be raised by any party at any time.2 97 Second, the court
determines subject matter jurisdiction by "look[ing] to the face of the complaint,
examining the nature of the controversy and the relief sought."29 8 "[I]f it
appears from the face of a well-pleaded complaint hat an independent basis for
equity jurisdiction exists, our chancery courts may hear and adjudge law
claims."299
Justice Chandler recognized implicitly that circuit and chancery courts
share concurrent jurisdiction over mixed cases of law and equity,3 00 and he
acknowledged that prior opinions had expressed a preference for circuit court
jurisdiction,301 in part to preserve the right to trial by jury.3 02 Nevertheless, he
explained, "[A] party cannot, by invoking the right to a jury trial, secure a
transfer to circuit court of a case properly within the chancery court's
jurisdiction. "303
Justice Chandler addressed r cent cases that had held that breach of contract
cases were outside chancery court jurisdiction. He distinguished the cases,
finding that equitable relief was not appropriate in them.3 04 In contrast, a claim
for specific performance of a land-sale contract was firmly within the chancery
court's equity jurisdiction.305 Examining the complaint and the nature of the
controversy, Justice Chandler found that the "primary claim" was for specific
performance.306 This established chancery court jurisdiction over all the claims,
including those that might more appropriately belong in circuit court. The
chancery court's subject matter jurisdiction was determined at the time of filing
and was not eliminated by later decisions made by the plaintiffs. 307 And,
297. Id. at 716 (citing Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 So. 2d 948, 951 (Miss. 2000)).
298. Id. (citing RAS Family Partners v. Onnam Biloxi, LLC, 968 So. 2d 926, 928 (Miss. 2007). Justice
Chandler added, "The reviewing court must look to the substance, not the form, of a claim to determine
whether that claim is legal or equitable." Id. (citing Copiah Med. Assocs. v. Miss. Baptist Health Sys., 898 So.
2d 656, 661 (Miss. 2005)).
299. Id. (citing RE/Max Real Estate Partners, Inc., v. Lindsley, 840 So. 2d 709, 711-12 (Miss. 2003)).
Justice Chandler explained, "In that circumstance, the legal claims lie within the pendent jurisdiction of the
chancery court." Id. (citing Tillotson v. Anders, 551 So. 2d 212, 213 (Miss. 1989)). As long as the chancery
court's equity jurisdiction has attached, the chancery court has discretion to award legal and punitive damages.
Id. (citing RE/Max Real Estate Partners, 840 So. 2d at 712).
300. Id. (quoting RAS Family Partners, 968 So. 2d at 928) ("Conversely, 'if the complaint seeks legal
relief, even in combination with equitable relief, the circuit court can have proper subject matter
jurisdiction."').
301. Id. (quoting Burnette, 770 So. 2d at 952).
302. Id. (citing Burnette, 770 So. 2d at 952) ("This Court also has cited the constitutional right to a jury
trial as a reason for resolving doubtful cases in favor of circuit court jurisdiction.").
303. Id. at 716-17 (citing Issaquena Warren Counties Land Co. v. Warren County, 996 So. 2d 747, 751
(Miss. 2008)).
304. Id. at 717 (citing various cases and stating each of them "involved a breach-of-contract claim for
which damages, a legal remedy, was the appropriate remedy [and thus chancery court lacked equity
jurisdiction]").
305. Id. (citing Lee v. Coahoma Opportunities, Inc., 485 So. 2d 293, 294-95 (Miss. 1986)) ("A claim for
specific performance as a remedy for breach of contract is within the equity jurisdiction of the chancery
court.").
306. Id.
307. Id. at 718 ("Having filed an action for specific performance within the chancery court's jurisdiction,
the fact that the Swareks now express a preference for a legal remedy does not divest the chancery court of
jurisdiction.").
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because the action was properly in chancery court, the plaintiff had no right to
trial by jury.3 0 8
Justice Randolph authored a second opinion, offering a cogent additional
reason for requiring litigation of the case in chancery court.3 09 The plaintiffs had
moved to transfer only after suffering adverse decisions from the chancery court
judge.3 10 Conceding that lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any
time, Justice Randolph asserted that the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents
parties from asserting a position at one stage of the proceedings and asserting a
contrary position later in the proceedings when it is to their advantage.3 11
Judicial estoppel and the principles of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 1
"should preclude a litigant from 'testing the waters' in one court, suffering
adverse rulings, then deciding that their initial declaration regarding jurisdiction
was erroneous, and seeking transfer to a different court or judge."3 12
b. Civil Actions Commenced in Circuit Court that Required Transfer to
Chancery Court
i. Efficiency as a Ground for Transfer
Rogers v. Eaves stemmed from a bitter domestic dispute that included
unproved accusations of child abuse.3 13 After the chancery court decided the
claims for divorce, custody, and support,3 14 the former wife commenced a civil
action in circuit court against her former lawyers, alleging legal malpractice.3 15
The circuit court granted the lawyers' motion to transfer to the chancery court
that had decided the divorce action, and the wife brought an interlocutory
appeal.316
The supreme court affirmed.3 17  The opinion by Justice Easely
characterized the issue on appeal as a challenge to the chancery court's
jurisdiction based on the argument that the tort claim fell "exclusively" within
circuit court jurisdiction.3 18 Given the framing of the issue, the court might have
308. Id. at 720 (Randolph, J., concurring opinion joined by majority of members of court).
309. Id. at 720-21.
310. Id. at 720.
311. Id. at 720-21. ("[U]nder the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a party is precluded 'from asserting a
position, benefitting from that position, and then, when it becomes more convenient or profitable, retreating
from that position later in the litigation."') (quoting Dockins v. Allred, 849 So. 2d 151, 155 (Miss. 2003)).
312. Id. at 720.
313. 812 So. 2d 208, 209 (Miss. 2002). Justice Carlson dissented without separate written opinion, and
Justice Cobb dissented in part without separate written opinion.
314. Rogers v. Morin, 791 So. 2d 815 (Miss. 2001) (affirming chancery court divorce decision). The
former husband was ordered to pay lump-sum alimony in the amount of $12,496.91 and granted unsupervised
custody of the minor child. Eaves, 812 So. 2d at 209. The former wife was ordered to pay her ex-husband over
$39,000 for fees and costs he incurred in defending against the unproven allegations. Id.
315. Eaves, 812 So. 2d at 209. The chancery court decision in the divorce action was entered July 24,
1998. Id. On February 26, 1999, the former wife commenced an action in circuit court against the lawyers who
represented her at early stages of the divorce proceedings, claiming negligent representation and breach of duty
of care. Id
316. Id.
317. Id. at 212.
318. Id at2l0.
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affirmed on the narrow ground that chancery court clearly has jurisdiction over
tort claims for any number of reasons-to provide equitable relief, to provide
legal relief under the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine, or to avoid a
multiplicity of suits.3 19 But Justice Easley did not rest his decision on such a
narrow ground. He made two legal steps that were unnecessary and arguably
erroneous, both related to the statute under which the defendants sought to
transfer the action. The defendants did not move to transfer the action under
section 162 of the Mississippi Constitution, which governs actions that should
have been brought in chancery court.3 20 Instead, they sought authority to
transfer under the statute that provides chancery court with jurisdiction to decide
cases after transfer.32 1 While the statute serves to establish jurisdiction even
when cases have been erroneously transferred,3 22 it neither gives the circuit court
authority to transfer cases to chancery court nor prevents the Mississippi
Supreme Court from reversing erroneous transfers that are brought to its
attention by interlocutory appeal.
Justice Easley's first analytic step was to misconstrue the grant of
jurisdiction to chancery court after transfer as a grant to the circuit court of a
power to transfer.323 His second step was to look to Mississippi Rule of Civil
Procedure 1 for the criteria governing transfer decisions.324 Rule 1 prescribes
that the rules of procedure be construed to secure a "just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."3 25  It provides a principle for
construing procedural rules, not statutes. Like all rules of procedure, Rule 1 is
limited by the explicit provision that it "shall not be construed to extend or limit
the jurisdiction of the courts of Mississippi."32 6
In finding that transfer promoted efficiency, Justice Easley emphasized that
to prevail on the malpractice claims, the plaintiff would be required to show she
would have obtained more favorable results in chancery court without the
negligence of the lawyers who represented her there.327
319. The rules had not yet been amended to provide for transfer for forum non conveniens. Cf Miss. R.
Civ. P. 82(e) (added 2004).
320. MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. VI, § 162.
321. Eaves, 812 So. 2d at 210-11 (quoting circuit court's decision). In granting the motion to transfer,
the circuit court found that the chancery court "will have jurisdiction of this matter upon transfer pursuant to
[section 9-5-81], that this case also involves minor's business, and that in the interest of judicial economy and
the just, speedy and inexpensive termination of this action, the motion to transfer should be sustained." Id.
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-5-81 (2014) ("The chancery court in addition to the full jurisdiction in all the matters
and cases expressly conferred upon it by the Constitution shall have jurisdiction of all cases transferred to it by
the circuit court or remanded to it by the supreme court; and such further jurisdiction, as is, in this chapter or
elsewhere, provided by law.").
322. Eaves, 812 So. 2d at 211 (citing Hopson v. Meredith, 719 So. 2d 1176, 1176 (Miss. 1998)). Section
9-5-8 1 is the sole authority cited by Justice Easley for the jurisdiction of the court.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 210 (quoting Miss. R. Civ. P. 1) (internal quotations omitted).
326. Miss. R. Civ. P. 82(a).
327. Eaves, 812 So. 2d at 211.
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Therefore, the Chancery Court ... is in the best position to
efficiently examine the facts and circumstances of the divorce
proceeding and related issues. All of these issues of divorce,
alimony and other related proceedings are all clearly within the
subject matter jurisdiction specifically granted to our chancery
courts.3 28
The court did not address the obstacle that a malpractice action for damages
is not within chancery court's original jurisdiction any more than a car accident
involving a minor. Efficiency, while a laudable goal, has never provided a basis
for transferring or consolidating claims involving different parties.329 The court
did not consider the question of whether transfer deprived the plaintiff of her
right to trial by jury. Perhaps the issue was not raised. Accordingly, the
Mississippi Supreme Court should consider overruling Rogers v. Eaves.
Because the right to a jury trial was either not raised or not addressed by the
court, the decision provides no authority for the conclusion that transfer under
the circumstances was constitutional or that convenience and efficiency provide
the sole criteria for determining whether transfer from circuit to chancery court is
proper.330
ii. Purely Equitable Claims
In Trustmark Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, beneficiaries of a trust sued the
corporate trustee in circuit court, alleging breach of trust.33 1 The circuit court
denied the trustee's motion to transfer to chancery court.332 The Mississippi
Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal and reversed.3 33  Justice
Carlson's opinion for the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that their claim
should be considered legal because it alleged negligence and sought a legal
remedy.334 He concluded, on the contrary, that the case fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of chancery court.3 35
328. Id.
329. In Germany v. Germany, the court refused to transfer the common law tort claims against the
husband's alleged paramour to chancery court even though it required the transfer of almost all of the claims
between the husband and wife to chancery court. 123 So. 3d 423, 428-34 (Miss. 2013). The factual issues
necessary to decide the claims in circuit court would certainly overlap with facts being litigated in chancery
court, but neither convenience nor the threat of factually inconsistent decisions provided a basis for transferring
an action lawfully brought in circuit court. See id. at 433-34.
In fact, efficiency alone does not require consolidating all claims in a single court. But see Breeden v.
Buchanan, 164 So. 3d 1057, 1072 (Ct. App. Miss. 2015) (James, J., dissenting) (arguing that case should have
been remanded to chancery court as the only court with "complete jurisdiction" over all claims because one
claim required vacating property decree in divorce action that was exclusively within chancery court's
jurisdiction).
330. Trustmark Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 865 So. 2d 1148, 1148 (Miss. 2004) (citing Eaves, 812 So. 2d at
211-12.) The court referred to dicta in Eaves as additional support for its holding in Trustmark Nat'1 Bank,
discussed infra text accompanying notes 339-340.
331. 865 So. 2d at 1148.
332. Id. at 1149.
333. Id. at 1153.
334. Id. at 1152.
335. Id.
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Justice Carlson attributed special importance to the fact that the litigation
involved rights created in a trust.336 The equity jurisdiction in chancery court
has long been construed by reference to the historical practice in chancery, and
trusts were recognized only in chancery, not common law courts.337 To the
extent the plaintiffs attempted to frame their case as one at law, Justice Carlson
wrote, "[A]s we have already noted, numerous cases ... have clearly directed
our trial courts to look to the substance of the claim rather than the form of the
case."338
The holding appears to be appropriate for two reasons. First, to prevent
plaintiffs from shifting trust litigation to circuit court by artful pleading, the
supreme court was obligated to look at the real issues. Just as the court held that
common law cases masquerading as equity claims must be litigated in circuit
court, Trustmark National Bank stands for the proposition that litigation of
traditional equity matters may not be brought in circuit court by camouflaging
them as common law claims. Second, litigation in chancery court may have
been required to avoid unnecessary, duplicative, and potentially inconsistent
adjudications, because the trust was administered under the authority of the
chancery court, and the periodic settlement of accounts would presumably affect
related breach of trust claims.
Justice Carlson also supported the conclusion in Trustmark by applying the
standard adopted in Rogers v. Eaves.339 He reasoned the chancery court was in a
better position to decide the case because the trust was under its jurisdiction from
its inception.340 Although this conclusion was supported by the unique facts of
the case, it lies in tension with the court's approach in other cases where the
court opined that when in doubt, circuit court is the preferable forum for cases of
mixed jurisdiction: "'it is more appropriate for a circuit court to hear equity
claims than it is for a chancery court to hear actions at law.'
341
iii. Efficiency and the Risk of Multiple Inconsistent Judgments
Germany v. Germany is a rare case in which the Mississippi Supreme Court
required part of an action commenced in circuit court to be transferred to
chancery court.342 While the unusual facts make the outcome reasonable, the
resulting elimination of the plaintiffs right to a jury trial in her chosen forum
provoked a spirited dissent.
336. Id. at 1153.
337. See generally Poole v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 44 So. 2d 467 (Miss. 1950); Smith v. Everett,
50 Miss. 575 (Miss. 1874). Trust interests were recognized by the chancellor, not common law courts. See
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 599 (5th ed. 1956).
338. TrustmarkNat'lBank, 865 So. 2d at 1152 (citing cases).
339. Id. at 1153 (citing Rogers v. Eaves, 812 So. 2d 208 (Miss. 2002)). See also supra text
accompanying notes 313-30.
340. The meaning of this criterion remains uncertain. On the one hand, it is unlikely that a chancellor
would have any special familiarity with a trust just because it was established in the chancery court's district.
On the other hand, claims for breach of trust against trustees of trusts that were established elsewhere would be
no less equitable and no more appropriate for circuit court litigation.
341. Tyson Breeders, Inc. v. Harrison, 940 So. 2d 230, 233 (Miss. 2006) (quoting Union Nat'l Life Ins.
Co. v. Crosby, 870 So. 2d 1175, 1182 (Miss. 2004).
342. 123 So. 3d 423, 423 (Miss. 2013).
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After a husband informed his wife that he intended to file for divorce, but
before he did so, the wife sued him and his alleged paramour in circuit court,
seeking money damages, an accounting, and injunctive relief.343 Four days later
the husband filed for divorce in chancery court.344 The wife's claims in circuit
court were based on theories of breach of contract, fraud, conversion, and other
intentional and negligent torts,345 but the husband moved to dismiss or to
transfer the wife's claims to chancery court where the divorce action was
pending.346 The circuit court denied the motion.347 On interlocutory appeal, the
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed.348 It ordered the claims arising out of the
financial relationship between the parties to be transferred to chancery court.349
But it concluded that the claims against the husband for intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress were "purely legal and are properly before the
circuit court." 350
In his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Waller carefully considered
the factual allegations that supported the claims. The wife was seeking a half
share of the $12 million the husband was scheduled to receive as settlement of
tobacco litigation.351 While she supported her ight to this share based on claims
of a premarital oral agreement to share expenses and income, Chief Justice
Waller emphasized that these rights arose less from contract than from the
marital relationship, and the parties commingled other property in ways that
were in dispute.352 While the contract claims might be distinct in theory, they
were not separable from all the other claims involving the marital property or
from the equitable claims of the spouses to individual property-all of which
were necessarily subject to distribution in the divorce proceedings.353
Chief Justice Waller identified how the division of marital assets in the
chancery court overlapped with the claimed right to the proceeds of the tobacco
settlement.354 In addition, he noted that a spouse's right might include a claim to
individual assets if necessary to avoid a deficit.355 For these reasons, the court
found "the substance of the breach-of-contract claim is related to divorce and
alimony and, thus, should be transferred to the chancery court proceeding."356
The court likewise held that the fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion claims
should also be transferred to chancery court because they were seeking to
343. Id. at 426.
344. Id.
345. Id. The intentional tort claims against the alleged paramour for which the wife sought actual and
punitive damages remained in circuit court and were not in issue. Id. at 434.




350. Id. at 434.
351. Id. at 428.
352. Id. at 428-29.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 429-30.
355. Id. at 430.
356. Id.
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recover marital assets that were before the chancery court.357 Because of the
complexity of the issues and the fact that the parties' finances were before the
chancery court, Chief Justice Waller reasoned the chancery court was also "in
the best position to address [the wife's] claim for accounting."358
In contrast, Chief Justice Waller found that the intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims relating to the husband's infidelity lay
beyond the scope of a divorce proceeding and thus would not be proper in
chancery court.3 59 He did not venture an opinion as to how the two sets of
claims could be coordinated to avoid inconsistent fact-finding, to preserve the
right to a jury, and to promote the expeditious and equitable termination of the
parties' marital relationship.
Three justices dissented from the decision requiring the transfer of any of
the wife's claims in circuit court to chancery court.360 In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Coleman offered a powerful argument for the need to preserve the right
to a civil jury trial in the context of transfer motions. Mere convenience, he
insisted, should never result in a transfer that deprives a party of the right to trial
by jury in a properly chosen court:
Judicial economy is indeed served by having [the wife's] claims
adjudicated in the same forum as [the husband's], and it is a
noble goal. However, if the bill comes due and shows the price
to be [her] constitutional right to a jury trial, I believe we must
decline the bargain.361
The dissent also pointed out the difficulty of making a jurisdictional
decision that required an evaluation of the substantial basis of a party's
claims.362  The dissent insisted that in a facial attack on jurisdiction, the
appellate court should accept the allegations as true.363 According to the dissent,
the majority had improperly looked beyond the pleadings when it rejected the
breach of contract claim as an adequate basis for circuit court jurisdiction, on the
ground that it was not an independently viable claim.364 Finally, the dissent
357. Id. at 431-32.
358. Id. at 433.
359. Id. at 434. The intentional and negligent infliction claims were analogous to alienation of affection
claims but were asserted against the usband based on a failure to warn of an affair or provide notice of a desire
for divorce. Id. The Mississippi courts had not recognized such claims. Id. at 433.
The husband argued that the merits of the claims were closely bound up with issues that were necessary to
determine in the chancery court's award of maintenance and in its division of assets. Id. Indeed, the husband's
intentional or negligent mistreatment of his wife seems directly relevant to two factors Chief Justice Waller
articulated earlier in his opinion that guide equitable division of assets: "[c]ontribution to the stability and
harmony of the marital and family relationships as measured by the quality, quantity of time spent on family
duties and duration of the marriage ... [and] [a]ny other factor which in equity should be considered." Id. at
429 (quoting Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994)).
360. Id. at 434 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 435. Justice Coleman distinguished cases where the law fixed the amount of damages and thus
made the right to jury decision-making insignificant. Id. at 435-36.
362. Id. at 436.
363. Id.
364. Id. This was the role of Rule 12.
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noted that requiring transfer conflicted with the court's adherence to the
principle of priority jurisdiction.365
IV. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR APPROACHING MIXED JURISDICTION CASES
A. Patterns in the Case Law
A review of the cases indicates clear patterns that make it possible to
suggest principles to guide future decisions.
1. Transfer of Cases Where the Filing Court Clearly Lacks Jurisdiction
The Mississippi Supreme Court has made clear that a case must be
transferred to the proper court if the court in which it is filed lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. These types of cases fall into two categories. In the first category,
claims that are obviously purely legal are filed in chancery court, or claims that
are obviously purely equitable are filed in circuit court.366 In the second
category, a plaintiff presents a legal claim camouflaged as an equitable claim in
chancery court367 or an equitable claim camouflaged as a legal claim in circuit
court.3 68
To prevent parties from bringing cases wherever they want, the Mississippi
Supreme Court has refused to give controlling effect to parties' own labels for
their claims. It sees that a request for a court order for a sum of money is really a
demand for damages that belongs in circuit court, not a suit for an injunction.369
A similar reluctance to give parties unlimited choice of court likewise supports
the court's refusal to give jurisdictional weight to requests for declaratory relief
because a request for such relief could be raised in almost every dispute.370
2. Transfer of Mixed Cases from Chancery to Circuit Court
In the majority of cases where plaintiffs have presented genuine, good faith,
mixed questions of law and equity in chancery court, the Mississippi Supreme
Court has required transfer to circuit court.37 1 The court's decisions have tended
to acknowledge the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction in chancery and circuit
court, but they have also manifested a policy requiring litigation of mixed cases
in circuit court. Moreover, the court's decisions reveal an unmistakable policy in
365. Id.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 106-12 (discussing Robertson v. Evans, 400 So. 2d 1214 (Miss.
1981)).
367. See supra text accompanying notes 113-18 (discussing Tillotson v. Anders, 551 So. 2d 212 (Miss.
1989)); supra text accompanying notes 143-48 (discussing Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Smith, 854 So. 2d 1045
(Miss. 2003)); supra text accompanying notes 101-05 (discussing Dixie Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Allison, 372 So.
2d 1081 (Miss. 1979)).
368. See supra text accompanying notes 331-41 (discussing Trustmark Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 865 So.
2d 1148 (Miss. 2004)).
369. See supra text accompanying notes 101-05 (discussing Dixie Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Allison, 372 So.
2d 1081 (Miss. 1979)).
370. See supra text accompanying notes 134-42 (discussing Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.,
770 So. 2d 948 (Miss. 2000)). See also supra note 141.
371. See supra Section III.A.2-4.
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favor of litigating related claims between the same parties in a single forum, only
on rare occasions splitting claims for simultaneous proceedings in circuit and
chancery court.
The opinions demonstrate a certain inconsistency that becomes
understandable in light of the constitutional history. On the one hand, a few
opinions speak directly of the concurrent jurisdiction of circuit and chancery
court over mixed cases of law and equity,3 72 and Justice Chandler comes very
close to acknowledging overlapping jurisdiction in mixed cases, though he
avoids using the term "concurrent jurisdiction."37 3 On the other hand, a number
of opinions refer to the exclusive jurisdiction of circuit court over mixed claims
while opining, perhaps inconsistently, that litigating in circuit court is better or
more appropriate.
The source of the Mississippi Supreme Court's tendency to classify mixed
cases as falling either within the exclusive jurisdiction of circuit court or within
the exclusive jurisdiction of chancery court is procedural. In 1890, such cases
could be brought in either court and a final judgment could not be reversed
solely due to a claimed lack of jurisdiction as to law or equity.374 But after the
court began to review transfer issues by interlocutory appeal, it found itself
responding to arguments directed at constitutional provisions that mandate
transfer of matters lying within the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the other court.
The Mississippi Constitution nowhere defines what "exclusive" cases must be
transferred.37 5 It left that interpretation up to trial judges. After the supreme
court began to review the decisions on interlocutory appeal, it offered
authoritative holdings. While some opinions, like Burnette, based the
requirement to transfer on a complete lack of chancery court jurisdiction,37 6
most cases began to identify the real source of the need to transfer as the policy
of preserving the right to trial by jury.
Perhaps it would be desirable for the legislature explicitly to authorize both
circuit and chancery courts to exercise jurisdiction over mixed cases; to provide
a statute authorizing transfer of cases (including those that are not within the
"exclusive" jurisdiction of the other court); and to direct chancery courts to
transfer mixed cases to circuit court when necessary to preserve the right to trial
by jury. This would avoid the problem the Mississippi Supreme Court has
struggled with: how to recognize concurrent jurisdiction in mixed cases when the
constitutional authority to transfer is phrased in terms of "exclusive jurisdiction."
Barring such legislation, however, the Mississippi Supreme Court's current
approach is workable. It is open to objection on theoretical grounds only in that
372. See supra text accompanying notes 209-21 & 244-53.
373. See Derr Plantation v. Swarek, 14 So. 3d 711, 716 (Miss. 2006); supra note 300 and accompanying
text.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
375. In contrast, for the narrow range of concurrent jurisdiction specifically granted to circuit and
chancery courts on suits on bonds of fiduciaries and public officers, the Mississippi Constitution provides that
the circuit court "may" transfer accounts that are mutual and complicated upon motion by the defendant. MISS.
CONST. art. VI, § 161.
376. Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 So. 2d 948, 952 (Miss. 2000); supra note 135 and
accompanying text.
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it seems to deny the broad reach of equity cleanup or supplemental jurisdiction.
But in preferring litigation of mixed cases in circuit court in order to preserve the
right to trial by jury,377 the law is clear: such cases must be transferred either
because circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction or because the supreme court
compels their transfer to preserve the right to trial by jury.
3. Denial of Transfer of Mixed Cases from Chancery to Circuit Court:
Timeliness of Transfers, Waiver, and Estoppel
The mixed cases in which the Mississippi Supreme Court has concluded
that transfer from chancery to circuit court is not appropriate each present unique
facts and circumstances and are, therefore, distinguishable from those in which
the court has required (or preferred) litigation in circuit court. First, in Issaquena
Warren Counties Land Co. v. Warren County, the amount of damages was fixed
as a matter of law and could easily be determined by the chancellor.3 78 Thus, a
jury trial was unnecessary. Second, in both City of Starkville v. 4-County
Electric Power Association and Derr Plantation, Inc. v. Swarek, the plaintiffs,
who originally chose to litigate in chancery court, moved to transfer and did so
after a period of litigation had occurred in the chancery court.379
In Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., however, when a plaintiff
brought either a legal or mixed case in chancery court and then months later
moved to transfer it to circuit court, the court held that the delay did not prevent
transfer.3 80 In explaining the result, Justice Mills relied specifically on the fact
that the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure do not require the right to trial by
jury to be raised in the pleadings and that the rules permit challenges to subject
matter jurisdiction to be raised by any party or by the court at any time (prior to
final judgment).381 But he also observed, "[T]he litigant has the duty to move
the court to transfer [the case]."382 In another case, Dixie National Insurance
Co. v. Allison, the Mississippi Supreme Court raised the jurisdictional issue on
its own and sent the case back to the right court.383
As these cases demonstrate, where the parties fail to raise the transfer issue
in a timely manner or fail to raise it at all, the question of whether transfer of
mixed cases is jurisdictional (required to police the limits of lower court
authority established by the Mississippi Constitution) or whether it preserves
litigants' individual right to a jury trial makes a difference. Where the court has
characterized the issue of transfer as jurisdictional, it has concluded that the issue
of transfer need not be raised in a timely manner. Justice Mills and Justice
Randolph have supported this conclusion with reference to Rule 12 of the
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, permitting lack of subject matter
377. The right to trial by jury could be preserved by requiring jury trial in chancery court, but a majority
of justices have not yet embraced that as a solution for mixed cases. See Tillotson v. Anders, 551 So. 2d 219,
226-27 (Miss. 1989) (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting).
378. See supra text accompanying notes 287-90.
379. See supra text accompanying notes 263-66 & 291-93.
380. 770 So. 2d at 951.
381. Id. (citing Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)); id. at 951-52 (citing Miss. R. Civ. P. 38(b)).
382. Id. at 950 (citing Boyett v. Boyett, 119 So. 299 (Miss. 1928)).
383. 372 So. 2d 1085 (Miss. 1979).
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jurisdiction to be raised at any time.384 The rule liberally preserves challenges to
subject matter jurisdiction and is copied verbatim from the federal rules.38 5
Because federal courts have only limited jurisdiction, and because an exercise of
jurisdiction beyond those limits threatens an unconstitutional usurpation of
power preserved to the state courts, the federal courts have a special duty to
police the limits of their authority. For that reason, private parties may not
establish federal judicial authority by consent or waiver, and the federal rules
carefully exclude matters of subject matter jurisdiction from other defenses that
are waived by delay such as personal jurisdiction or venue.386
Unlike federal courts, state courts have general jurisdiction over all cases,
except the few areas that are removed from them by operation of federal law.
Though the circuit courts are the only courts within the Mississippi state system
that have general jurisdiction, a chancery court or county court's exercise of
jurisdiction beyond its limits affects only the division of labor within the state
system. Such overreaching is a matter of concern to litigants but does not
threaten the constitutional order. This important difference from the federal
practice explains why, for example, chancery courts enjoy the same presumption
of correct jurisdiction that obtains in circuit courts.387
Where the Mississippi Constitution firmly fixes jurisdiction exclusively
within one state court, there may be good reasons to permit indefinite challenges
to decisions interfering with that exclusive jurisdiction. A circuit court that
admits a will to probate or enters a decree of divorce may be acting so far outside
its authority that it should be subject to challenge at any time by any party or by
the court itself. And the Mississippi Constitution does not protect final
judgments or decrees in such situations from reversal. In contrast, permitting
indefinite challenges to chancery court jurisdiction over related legal claims is
inconsistent with the coordinated jurisdictional scheme created for the circuit and
chancery courts under the Mississippi Constitution, which provides that even
erroneous final judgments may not be challenged due to errors of law or
equity.388
Perhaps nothing is clearer from the long history of contests over legal and
equitable jurisdiction than this: the drafters of the 1890 Mississippi Constitution
meant for the issue to be resolved promptly by the circuit and chancery court
judges. In the days before interlocutory appeal, the trial court's decision on the
issue was effectively final, whether right or wrong. The more recent procedural
384. Derr Planation v. Swarek, 14 So. 3d 711, 720 (Miss. 2006) (Randolph, J., concurring); see Burnette,
770 So. 2d at 951 (citing Justice Mills).
385. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) ("Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the
responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion: (1) lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction . . . .").
386. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (3).
387. Where a party does not challenge the chancery court's jurisdiction at trial, the same heavy burden
applies to challenging its jurisdiction on appeal as applies to challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of a
court of general jurisdiction. See Crowe v. Smith, 603 So. 2d 301, 306 (Miss. 1992) (citing Majors v. Purnell's
Pride, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 328, 329 (N.D. Miss. 1973); Dyer v. Russell, 38 So. 2d 104, 107 (Miss. 1949))
(dismissing challenge to chancery court jurisdiction raised on appeal and referring to "presumption of correct
jurisdiction").
388. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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opportunities for interlocutory review were designed to shorten, not prolong,
litigation, and the Mississippi Supreme Court in granting interlocutory relief can
and should avoid encouraging delinquent motions. Indeed, when the court began
reviewing such errors on interlocutory appeal, a dissent argued that the review
frustrated the limits imposed by the Mississippi Constitution on the supreme
court's power to review jurisdictional errors.3 89
While the right to trial by jury is important enough to require transfer, the
constitutional source of that right does not require transferforever. It is true that
parties are not required to demand a right to trial by jury,390 but under the
Mississippi Constitution, this right is preserved without a demand only in circuit
court, because there is no right to a jury trial in chancery court.39 1 Thus, the
supreme court's practice of permitting interlocutory reviews should not bind the
court to permitting them forever and under all circumstances. Allowing the issue
to be raised months or years later rewards parties that invited judicial error, it
delays decisions on the merits and multiplies costs to the parties and to the
courts-all in opposition to the prime directive to interpret the rules of procedure
so as to achieve "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."39 2 The Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized practical imits on
the timing of motions for transfer. For example, it has invoked the principle of
priority jurisdiction to require the consolidation of litigation in a court system in
which the action was first properly commenced, even when other courts had
jurisdiction.393 And a majority of the court embraced Justice Randolph's theory
that the principle of judicial estoppel prevents a plaintiff under some
circumstances from bringing a case in chancery court and subsequently
transferring it to circuit court.39 4
Justice Randolph's reasoning is convincing, and we propose that it should
apply generally so as to prevent transferring such actions after a reasonable time.
The supreme court has the authority to refuse to grant interlocutory relief under
circumstances that frustrate the ends of justice. Although Justice Randolph
articulated the principle of estoppel in a case where the plaintiffs sought transfer
years after filing the action in chancery court and only after suffering adverse
rulings, defendants are also prejudiced in a more routine case like Burnette. In
that case the plaintiff's counsel seems to have made a legal error in bringing the
action in chancery court in February. New counsel moved to transfer to circuit
court in October, and, when the motion was denied, instead of seeking
interlocutory review, moved to reconsider in June, and later appealed the denial
of the motion to reconsider.3 95 As a consequence, the supreme court granted the
plaintiffs request to transfer nearly four years after the plaintiff filed in the
389. Tillotson v. Anders, 551 So. 2d 212, 219-26 (Miss. 1989) (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting).
390. Miss. R. Civ. P. 38. Cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d) (requiring that a jury be demanded or it is waived).
391. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
392. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 1.
393. See supra text accompanying notes 219-21 and notes 284-86 and accompanying text. See also
Estate of Davis v. Baylock, 2017 WL 58188, at *3 (Miss. Jan. 5, 2017) (discussing priority jurisdiction).
394. See supra note 295; text accompanying notes 309-312.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
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wrong court.39 6 The result in Burnette is difficult to defend, and the supreme
court should consider overruling it outright by creating a rule that requires a
timely motion to transfer. If unwilling to overrule the decision, it should refrain
from following it in future cases where defendants rely on the defense of judicial
estoppel.
4. Grant of Transfer to Chancery Court
In the few cases where the Mississippi Supreme Court has concluded that a
mixed case should be transferred from circuit court to chancery court, the court
has tended to focus on whether equitable relief is required, whether the outcome
of related common law claims would depend on the adjudication of equitable
ones, and whether litigation in chancery court would avoid a real risk of
multiplicitous or inconsistent judgments.
B. The Proposal
Consistent with the large majority of the Mississippi Supreme Court's
decisions, this Article proposes that, absent exceptional circumstances, cases
presenting mixed common law and equity claims should be brought in or
transferred to circuit court.397  But, recognizing there is an underlying
foundation of shared jurisdiction in such cases, this Article also proposes that the
motion to transfer must be timely raised and should not be entertained when
raised by the party who commenced the action. Jurisdictional decisions should
be made early in the proceedings and based primarily on the pleadings, and they
should not be affected by later changes to the character of the proceedings.39 8
The burden should be on the party opposing litigation in circuit court to make a
compelling argument in favor of the exceptional circumstances that require
litigation in chancery court with the attendant loss of trial by jury.
As formulated, the proposed standard would focus judicial attention on
what "exceptional circumstances" require litigation i chancery court. The cases
demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist when litigation in circuit court
would result in judicial inconvenience coupled with the real risk of
multiplicitous litigation or inconsistent judgments. In our opinion, Justice
Coleman is correct in asserting that judicial inconvenience alone should not
support requiring litigation in chancery court.399 We thus contend Rogers v.
Eaves should be distinguished or overruled since the court in that case relied on
the efficiency that would be gained by transferring the case to chancery court.
400
396. Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 So. 2d 948, 950 (Miss. 2000).
397. This standard is similar to the Missouri approach to preserving jury trial in cases of equitable
cleanup jurisdiction "[u]nless circumstances clearly demand otherwise." State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherry, 137
S.W.3d 462, 473 (Mo. 2004).
398. See Ram-Kabir of Am. LLC v. S.C. Anderson Grp. Int'l, 199 So. 3d 1240, 1241, 1243 (Miss. 2016)
(holding county court jurisdiction was established by good faith claim in complaint, and court did not lose
jurisdiction when plaintiff amended complaint to seek fees, even though total relief then exceeded statutory
limit on jurisdiction).
399. Germany v. Germany, 123 So. 3d 423, 434 (Miss. 2013) (Coleman, J., dissenting); see supra text
accompanying note 361.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 324-30 (discussing Rogers v. Eaves, 812 So. 2d 208 (Miss.
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Likewise, we contend that RE/Max Real Estate Partners v. Lindsley should not
be followed because no exceptional circumstances warranting litigation in
chancery court were present.401 In Lindsley, a majority of the court
overemphasized the plaintiff's right to select the forum and the reasons chancery
court was a better forum; in doing so the opinion failed to recognize that
jurisdiction in chancery court was doubtful and gave insufficient weight to the
defendant's right to a jury trial. Because there was no real risk of multiplicitous
litigation, inconsistent judgments, or any other compelling reason for litigation
to occur in chancery court the case should have been transferred.
In contrast to the facts in Rogers and RE/Max Real Estate Partners,
exceptional circumstances requiring litigation in chancery court would be
present when equitable relief is required and when the outcome of related
common law claims would depend on the adjudication of equitable ones. For
example, when there is a need for an equitable remedy to establish immediate
ownership of or priority to assets that may be dissipated during litigation, a
strong case exists for the chancery court to take jurisdiction and to resolve
closely related legal claims for damages. In determining whether exceptional
circumstances exist in such cases, courts should focus on the concrete need for
equitable relief and the extent to which a jury trial would cause delays or create a
risk of inconsistent judgements.
The decision to order transfer of circuit court claims in Germany v.
Germany provides an instructive example of the proposed standard. On one
hand, if the only benefit of transfer were judicial efficiency, then the
requirements for transfer would not be satisfied. On the other hand, transfer to
chancery court was appropriate because additional reasons were present that
supported transfer. As the majority explained, the tort and contract theories
raised in circuit court were inseparable from the equitable and other claims to
marital property being decided in chancery court. Moreover, the chancery
court's exclusive jurisdiction over divorce and the need for prompt, permanent
division of property upon divorce provide additional circumstances that
warranted transfer to chancery court.
Similarly, where a party presents a meritorious claim for preliminary
injunctive relief but also demands damages, the chancellor should normally
proceed to decide all claims, though some chancery courts transfer legal matters
to circuit court after deciding equity matters.402  Granting a preliminary
injunction requires a preliminary evaluation of the merits, and many preliminary
injunctions evolve into permanent injunctions that embody decisions on the
merits. It would be undesirable to postpone equitable relief pending a jury
determination (or pending decision on a motion for summary judgment
determining the lack of an issue suitable for jury determination). But it would be
2002)).
401. See supra text accompanying notes 244-61 (discussing Re/Max Real Estate Partners v. Lindsley,
840 So. 2d 709, 712-13 (Miss. 2003)).
402. See Tyson Breeders, Inc. v. Harrison, 940 So. 2d 230 (Miss. 2006) (holding that the chancellor
should have transferred the whole case to circuit court at the outset instead of transferring the remaining issue
of damages to the circuit court after the equitable matter was resolved); supra notes 196-208 and
accompanying text.
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equally undesirable to preempt parallel proceedings in circuit court by a
chancellor's decision on related facts. To avoid duplicative litigation, a single
forum is required. Even if they have constitutional authority, the circuit courts
are poorly equipped to handle preliminary injunctions,40 3 so chancery court
appears to be the proper forum for deciding mixed cases that commence with a
good faith and meritorious claim for preliminary injunctive relief Where the
relief is not granted, a strong case for transfer exists.
As case law also demonstrates, exceptional circumstances requiring
litigation in chancery court exist where the plaintiff has chosen to file a mixed
case in chancery court and the amount of damages is fixed by law. In such a
case, a jury trial is unnecessary, and given the continued existence of cleanup or
supplemental jurisdiction in chancery court, this type of case can and should be
litigated in chancery court.
The proposed "exceptional circumstances" standard goes far towards
explaining what the Mississippi Supreme Court has done in most cases. While it
is open ended, we are confident Mississippi courts are capable of developing a
coherent body of law to govern its application. The proposed standard alerts
parties about where they should file and what they should address in argument.
It focuses the attention of litigants, trial judges, and appellate courts on what is
important: identifying concrete factors that are of sufficient weight and
importance to outweigh the right to jury trial. Although the court's prior
decisions requiring litigation in chancery court do not employ the proposed
standard, most of them conform to it and thus provide useful examples. With
further judicial clarification of exceptional circumstances, the proposed standard
should also decrease the frequency of interlocutory appeals, which in turn should
reduce trial delays, litigation costs, and the administrative burden on appellate
courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The Mississippi Constitution creates separate circuit and chancery courts
and assigns exclusive jurisdiction over equitable matters to chancery courts,
while circuit courts retain general jurisdiction over all matters not vested in
another court. The Mississippi Constitution preserves the right to a jury trial, but
only for common law claims in circuit court.
Many cases, however, seek both equitable relief and damages. Because the
Mississippi Constitution prohibits jurisdictional errors from being corrected after
a final judgment in the trial court, parties routinely seek interlocutory review of
transfer decisions in mixed cases, thereby taxing the court system's resources.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has issued conflicting opinions regarding
which court should try mixed cases of law and equity. Some decisions recognize
concurrent jurisdiction in both courts and respect the plaintiff's choice of forum,
while other decisions emphasize the right to a jury trial and require transfer to
circuit court. The lack of clarity from the supreme court about which court
403. The docket priority required for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions would
interfere with the docket priority accorded to criminal matters in circuit court.
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should hear mixed cases encourages forum shopping and leads to uncertainty for
litigants and lower court judges. This, in turn, increases the number of
interlocutory appeals burdening the judicial system.
This Article explores the forum dilemma presented by mixed jurisdiction
cases. It carefully examines the cases and finds a clear preference for the trial of
mixed cases in circuit court unless exceptional circumstances warrant litigation
in chancery court. Consistent with the cases, this Article proposes that absent
exceptional circumstances, mixed jurisdiction cases should be brought in or
transferred to circuit court. It considers the types of cases that may qualify as
exceptional, and it proposes that motions to transfer actions commenced in the
wrong court must be filed in a timely fashion. The proposed standard respects
the constitutional division of labor between circuit and chancery courts, accords
appropriate weight to the right to a jury trial, and reduces uncertainty about what
court should decide cases with mixed common law and equity claims.
